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Abstract
We study the reachability problem for cryptographic protocols represented as processes relying
on perfect cryptographic functions. We introduce a symbolic reduction system that can handle
hashing functions, symmetric keys, and public keys. Desirable properties such as secrecy or
authenticity are speci)ed by inserting logical assertions in the processes.
We show that the symbolic reduction system provides a 6exible decision procedure for )nite
processes and a reference for sound implementations. The symbolic reduction system can be
regarded as a variant of syntactic uni8cation which is compatible with certain set-membership
constraints. For a signi8cant fragment of our formalism, we argue that a dag implementation of
the symbolic reduction system leads to an algorithm running in NPTIME thus matching the lower
bound of the problem.
In the case of iterated or )nite control processes, we show that the problem is undecidable
in general and in PTIME for a subclass of iterated processes that do not rely on pairing. Our
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1. Introduction
Protocols based on cryptographic operations are used to protect the access to com-
puter systems and the transmission of data on networks. Other application domains
such as smart cards are emerging.
The experience has shown that the design of these protocols is error-prone. Intu-
itively, the reason is that the protocols are asynchronous and communicate in the pres-
ence of an adversary that can intercept, analyse, and modify the messages exchanged.
Thus the execution of a protocol is highly non-deterministic and even for simple, 8nite
protocols it requires the analysis of a potentially in8nite number of behaviours of the
adversary.
Following a tradition that originates with the work of Dolev and Yao [17], we take a
formal approach that is we consider idealised=perfect versions of the cryptographic op-
erations (see [6] for an interesting comparison with the complexity-based approaches)
and we focus in particular on fully automatic decision procedures which return exact
answers with respect to the abstract model. This excludes methods such as theorem
proving [8,30], model-checking based on 8nite models [25,14,28,19], and abstract in-
terpretation [29,21]. Of course, there are good reasons to study these methods but we
will not comment on them here.
A variety of formalisms for the speci8cation of cryptographic protocols have been
proposed based on, e.g., 8rst-order logic [33], linear logic [20], process calculi [23],
and equational logic [24]. Here we follow [3,23,2] and we model the protocol and the
speci8cation as a parallel process, 1 decorated with logical assertions, and interacting
with an adversary.
The veri8cation problem then amounts to checking that no invalid assertion is reach-
able. In previous work [2], we have proposed a symbolic reduction system that allows
to decide the reachability problem for 8nite processes (i.e. processes without iteration
or recursion) relying on symmetric keys. In this paper, we further develop our method
in two main directions.
(1) We show that our symbolic reduction system can be generalised to handle hash-
ing functions, public keys, and certain logical assertions. The logical assertions we
consider are arbitrary boolean combinations of atomic predicates stating the equal-
ity of two messages or the secrecy of a message. We claim that our method pro-
vides a 6exible decision procedure for )nite processes and a good reference for op-
timised implementations that match the complexity lower bound of the problem
(NPTIME).
(2) In the case of iterated or )nite control processes, we show that the problem
is undecidable in general and PTIME decidable for a subclass of iterated processes that
do not rely on the pairing constructor. This result is based on the classical theory of
rational transduction of regular languages. We will show that it applies to a class of
processes strictly containing the ‘ping-pong’ protocols studied in [18].
Related work. As for contribution (1), Huima [23] seems the 8rst author to have
put forward a symbolic reduction system. Unfortunately, his approach is complicated
1 Henceforth, in the context of our model, we will speak of processes rather than of protocols.
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by a representation of messages as terms modulo a canonical theory (rather than as
terms of a free algebra as we do here) and moreover it appears to be incomplete. Later,
Boreale [9] has proposed, independently from our 8rst contribution [2], another sym-
bolic reduction system with a rather diLerent technical 6avour. Currently other research
groups (notably, Abadi et al. in Santa Cruz, Millen et al. in Palo Alto, Rusinowitch et
al. in Nancy) propose symbolic reduction systems in the same spirit. While the basic
complexity question is now settled (cf. Section 8) there is still considerable space for
optimisation and design issues.
Another thread of work relates to our contribution (2). This thread begins of course
with [18]. Later contributions of Monniaux [29] and Weidenbach [33] have brought
into the limelight some related tools: tree automata, set-constraints, monadic class. In
particular, following the work described here, Comon et al. [16] and one of the authors
[1] suggest fruitful generalisations of the techniques presented in Section 9.
It should be noted that so far the techniques designed for iterated processes do not
readily apply to )nite processes (and vice versa). We still need a uni8ed technical
framework that can deal with both aspects while still providing veri8cation tools with
optimal complexity.
Organisation. The paper is organised as follows. In Section 2 we introduce our model
and state the reachability problem. In Section 3 we show that the problem is NP-hard
for 8nite processes and undecidable for iterated or 8nite control processes. In Section 4,
we prove some basic properties on the symbolic representation of con)gurations. In
Section 5, we apply these properties to build a basic symbolic reduction system. This
system is further extended in Section 6 to fully cover our process model, and in
Section 7 to handle a language of assertions with which we annotate the processes.
In Section 7, we also discuss the speci8cation of security properties and comment on
a prototype implementation of the symbolic reduction system. In Section 8, we show
that (part of) our symbolic reduction system can be implemented to run in NPTIME.
Finally, in Section 9 we exhibit a class of iterated processes without pairing for which
the reachability problem is decidable in PTIME.
Given the considerable length of this work, we will often hint to the main ideas
and shift the most technical proofs to Appendix A. An expanded version of this paper
appears as [5]. Omitted proofs can be found there.
2. Model
We consider terms over an in8nite signature: = {C0n}n∈! ∪{E2; 〈 ; 〉2}. Thus we
have an in8nite set of constants and two binary constructors E for encoding and 〈 ; 〉
for pairing. We use the following standard notation: x; y; : : : for (term) variables; V for
the set of variables; T(V ) for the collection of 8nite terms over ∪V ; t; t′; : : : for
terms in T(V ); t˜ for vectors of terms; [t=x] for the substitution of t for x. We denote
with Var(t) the variables occurring in the term t, and by extension, if T is a set of
terms then Var(T )=
⋃
t∈T Var(t).
Names. We distinguish between basic names (agent’s names, nonces, keys,: : :)
and composed messages. The set of names N is de8ned as {C0n}n∈!. We assume a
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(computable) relation D⊆N×N with the interpretation:
(C; C′) ∈ D iL messages encrypted with C can be decrypted with C′:
We de8ne Inv(C)= {C′ | (C; C′)∈D}. Further hypotheses, on the properties of D allow
to model hashing, symmetric, and public keys. In particular: (i) for a hashing key
C; Inv(C)= ∅, (ii) for a symmetric key C; Inv(C)= {C}, and (iii) for a public key
C there is another key C′ such that Inv(C)= {C′} and Inv(C′)= {C}.
Messages. The set of closed messages M is de8ned as the least set that contains
N and such that:
t ∈M and t′ ∈N ⇒ E(t; t′) ∈M;
t; t′ ∈M ⇒ 〈t; t′〉 ∈M:
We also de8ne the set of open messages MV as the least set that contains N∪V and
such that:
t ∈MV and t′ ∈N ⇒ E(t; t′) ∈MV ;
t; t′ ∈MV ⇒ 〈t; t′〉 ∈MV :
We note that: (i) if E(t; t′) is a subterm of a term in MV then t′ ∈N, and that (ii) if
t ∈MV and  is a substitution mapping variables to elements of MV then (t)∈MV .
The formal model of messages we study in this paper is fairly standard, cf., e.g.,
[6,10,27]. We note that speci8c crypto-systems such as RSA may satisfy additional
algebraic properties. The axioms above are not meant to describe a speci8c crypto-
system instead they should be read as a speci8cation to be implemented on top of
some standard crypto-system. We also remark that in our model keys can only be
simple names and not ‘complex’ keys such as pairs or encrypted messages. Extending
the symbolic reduction to a model with complex keys is a non-trivial task which is
currently studied by several research groups (Abadi et al. in Santa Cruz, Millen et al.
in Palo Alto, Rusinowitch et al. in Nancy to name a few).
Synthesis and analysis. The functions S (synthesis) and A (analysis) are closure
operators over the power set of terms T(V ) de8ned as follows:
• S(T ) is the least set that contains T and such that:
t1; t2 ∈ S(T ) ⇒ 〈t1; t2〉 ∈ S(T );
t1 ∈ S(T ); t2 ∈ T ∩N ⇒ E(t1; t2) ∈ S(T ):
• A(T ) is the least set that contains T and such that:
〈t1; t2〉 ∈ A(T ) ⇒ ti ∈ A(T ); i = 1; 2;
E(t1; t2) ∈ A(T ); A(T ) ∩ Inv(t2) = ∅ ⇒ t1 ∈ A(T ):
We note the following properties.
Proposition 2.1. Suppose T ⊆MV . Then:
(1) S(T ); A(T )⊆MV . Moreover, if T ⊆M then S(T ); A(T )⊆M.
(2) S preserves set-theoretic containment and S(S(T ))= S(T )⊇T .
(3) A preserves set-theoretic containment and A(A(T ))=A(T )⊇T .
R.M. Amadio et al. / Theoretical Computer Science 290 (2003) 695–740 699
(4) A(S(T ))= S(T )∪A(T ).
(5) A(S(A(T )))= S(A(T ))= S(A(S(T ))).
Proof. We observe that the operators A and S admit the following iterative de8nitions:
A(T ) =
⋃
n∈!
A(T )n A(T )0 = T;
A(T )n+1 = A(T )n ∪ {t1; t2 | 〈t1; t2〉 ∈ A(T )n}
∪ {t |E(t; C) ∈ A(T )n; Inv(C) ∩ A(T )n = ∅};
S(T ) =
⋃
n∈!
S(T )n S(T )0 = T;
S(T )n+1 = S(T )n ∪ {〈t1; t2〉 | ti ∈ S(T )n; i = 1; 2} ∪ {E(t; C) | t ∈ S(T )n; C ∈ T}:
From this remark the proof of (1–6) is rather direct (and available in [5]).
Processes. Processes are de8ned as follows:
P ::= 0|!t:P|?x:P|x ← dec(t; t′):P|x ← prjl(t):P|x ← prjr(t):P|
asrt(’):P|P|P′|[t = t′]P; P′|it P:
A process performs internal computation, interacts with the adversary via input and
output, and, from time to time, checks certain logical assertions ’. The informal de-
scription of the execution of a process is as follows: 0 is the process which is termi-
nated; !t:P evaluates t and if t is a message, sends it to the adversary and becomes
P (otherwise it terminates); ?x:P receives a message t from the adversary and be-
comes [t=x]P; x← dec(t; t′):P (dec for decryption) evaluates t; t′ and if t is a message
E(t′′; C) and t′ ∈ Inv(C) then it becomes [t′′=x]P (otherwise it terminates); similarly,
x← prjl(t):P (prjl for left projection) evaluates t and if t is a message 〈t′; t′′〉 then it
becomes [t′=x]P ([t′′=x]P) (otherwise it terminates); a symmetric interpretation applies
to the right projection prjr; asrt(’):P evaluates the boolean predicate ’ with respect to
T and becomes P if ’ holds (otherwise we terminate in the erroneous con8guration);
P |P′ is the asynchronous parallel composition of P and P′; [t = t′]P; P′ evaluates t
and t′ and if both are messages then it becomes P if t ≡ t′ and P′ if t ≡ t′ (otherwise
it terminates); it P is an unbounded iteration of P so that it P behaves as P | it P. We
denote with FV (P) the set of variables occurring free in P.
Denition 2.2. A well-formed con)guration k is either a special erroneous con8gu-
ration err or a pair (P; T ) where (i) P is a closed process and (ii) T is a non-empty
8nite subset of M which represents the current knowledge of the adversary.
In Fig. 1, we de8ne a reduction relation on well-formed con8gurations. In these
rules, we always reduce the leftmost process with the proviso that parallel composition
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(!) (!t:P |P′; T ) → (P |P′; T ∪{t}) if t ∈M
(?) (?x:P |P′; T ) → ([t=x]P |P′; T ) if t ∈ S(A(T ))
(d) (x← dec(E(t; C); C′):P |P′; T ) → ([t=x]P |P′; T ) if C′ ∈ Inv(C); t ∈M
(pl) (x← prjl(〈t; t′〉):P |P′; T ) → ([t=x]P |P′; T ) if t; t′ ∈M
(a) (asrt(’):P |P′; T ) →
{
(P |P′; T ) if |=T’
err if |=T’
(m1) ([t= t]P1; P2 |P′; T ) → (P1 |P′; T ) if t ∈M
(m2) ([t= t′]P1; P2 |P′; T ) → (P2 |P′; T ) if t = t′; t; t′ ∈M
(it) (itP |P′; T ) → (P | itP |P′; T )
Fig. 1. Reduction on con8gurations.
is associative and commutative. Moreover, we take the freedom of writing P as P | 0
whenever needed to apply a rewriting rule and we omit the symmetric rule for the
right projection.
We note that a thread is stuck whenever it tries (i) to evaluate a term which is not
a message, or (ii) to decrypt with a wrong key, or (iii) to project a message which
is not a pair. Concerning the language of assertions ’, for the time being, we just
assume that the condition |=T’ is decidable and that the formula false is an (invalid)
assertion. We turn next to the de8nition of the reachability problem.
Denition 2.3. Let k be a con8guration. We say that k can reach error if k ∗→ err.
Thus, the reachability problem is the problem of determining whether a con8guration
can reach the erroneous one.
Remark 2.4. In [2], we also consider a name generator operator (v x)P replacing x
with a fresh name. This operator can be speci8ed by adding a counter to a con8gura-
tion. We note that for 8nite processes the name generator can be statically eliminated,
and that for iterated/8nite state processes the name generator adds another source of
undecidability as shown in [20].
3. Lower bounds
We show that reachability is NP-hard for 8nite processes (without iteration) and
undecidable for processes allowing iteration. While these results appear to be folklore,
it is worth to spell them out trying to rely on as little machinery as possible. In the
following, we will just rely on symmetric keys, input, output, decryption, projection,
parallel composition, and the assertion false.
First, we introduce a notation to )lter inputs. Let t ∈MV be a linear term (all vari-
ables are distinct) generated by the grammar: t ::=y|E(t; C)|〈t; t〉. We de8ne case t= x
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in P by induction on t (x′; x′′ are fresh variables):
case y = x in P = [x=y]P
case E(t; C) = x in P = x′ ← dec(x; C):case t = x′ in P
case〈t′; t′′〉 = x in P = x′ ← prjl(x′):x′′ ← prjr(x):
case t′ = x′ in case t′′ = x′′ in P:
Finally, we abbreviate ?x= t:P≡ ?x:case t= x in P.
3.1. NP-hardness for )nite processes
We code satisfaction of a boolean formula in conjunctive normal form (CNF). Let 
be a formula in CNF depending on the boolean variables x1; : : : ; xn and composed of the
disjunctions  1; : : : ;  m. We assume the following distinct constants: C; C0; C1; V1; : : : ; Vn;
D1; : : : ; Dm. Initially, we set the knowledge of the adversary to:
T0 = {E(E(C; C0); C); E(E(C; C1); C)};
where we interpret E(C; C0) as the boolean value 0 and E(C; C1) as the boolean value 1.
We de8ne a process P which is the parallel composition of the following processes:
(1) ?x = E(y; C):!E(y; Vi):0; i = 1; : : : ; n (‘write once′ boolean
value in Vi)
(2) ?x = E(E(y; C1); Vi):!Dk:0; xi literal in  k (disjunction  k evaluates to 1)
(2′) ?x = E(E(y; C0); Vi):!Dk:0; xi literal in  k (disjunction  k evaluates to 1)
(3) ?x = E(· · ·E(y;Dm); : : : ; D1):asrt(false):0 (all disjunctions evaluate to 1)
We use a double level of encryption to be able to test in (2) and (2′) the contents of
a variable without relying on the conditional. The proof of the following proposition
is rather direct (and available in [5]).
Proposition 3.1. Let  be a boolean formula in CNF. Then  is satis)able i?
(P; T0)
∗→ err.
We point out that processes with several alternations of 8ltered inputs and outputs
can be compiled into the parallel composition of processes of the simpler shape above,
i.e., a 8ltered input followed by an output. For instance,
?x1 = t1:!s1:?x2 = t2:!s2:?x3 = t3:!s3:0; Var(si) ⊆ Var(ti); i = 1; 2; 3 becomes
?x1 = t1:!s1:0|?x′ = 〈t1; t2〉:!s2:0|?x′′ = 〈〈t1; t2〉; t3〉:!s3:0
which is a transformation that can square the size of the program. It is interesting
to formulate the reachability problem for these simple processes as the refutation of
a ‘logic program’ (this idea is already found in [20,33]). We introduce a monadic
predicate T with the interpretation:
T (t) iL t is known by the adversary:
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Given a con8guration k ≡ (P; T0) we de8ne the ‘logic’ program Lk as follows:
⊃ T (t) if t ∈ T0
T (t); T (t′) ⊃ T (〈t; t′〉) (synthesis pair)
T (t); T (t′) ⊃ T (E(t; t′)) (synthesis encryption)
T (〈t; t′〉) ⊃ T (t) (analysis pair left)
T (〈t; t′〉) ⊃ T (t′) (analysis pair right)
T (E(t; t′)); T (t′) ⊃ T (t) (analysis encryption)
T (t) ⊃ T (t′) if ?x = t:!t′:0 in P
(clauses executed at most once)
T (t) ⊂ ⊥ if ?x = t:asrt(false):0 in P:
The logic program Lk is actually a bit more liberal than our model as it allows to
conclude T (t) even when t ∈M. However, it is easy to get an exact correspondence
by introducing a second predicate M such that M (t) iL t ∈M. Then we re8ne, e.g.,
the clause for synthesis of encryption as follows:
T (t); T (t′); M (E(t; t′)) ⊂ T (E(t; t′)):
We also note that the logic program obtained is not quite standard as the clauses corre-
sponding to the program can be executed at most once while the clauses corresponding
to the adversary (initial knowledge, synthesis, and analysis) can be executed arbitrary
many times. For this reason, the presentation as a logic program does not seem to
oLer an immediate upper bound on the complexity of the reachability problem and this
(suggestive) point of view will not be further pursued in this paper.
3.2. Undecidability for iterated processes
We encode the halting problem for 2-counter machines into a reachability problem
for iterated processes (this has been suggested to us by H. Comon). We recall that a
two-counter non-deterministic machine is a tuple (Q;QF ; q0; ') with Q a set of states,
QF ⊆Q a set of )nal states q0 ∈Q the initial state and '⊆Q×{0; 1}2×Q×{−1; 0;
1}2 a transition relation. We assume that if (q; x1; x2; q′; y1; y2)∈' then yi = − 1
implies xi =1, for i=1; 2 (we can decrement a positive counter only). A con)guration
of the machine is a triple (q; n1; n2) with q∈Q; ni ∈! (the ni’s are the counters). We
have a reduction (q; n1; n2)→ (q′; n1 +y1; n2 +y2) if (q; x1; x2; q′; y1; y2)∈' and ni =0
iL xi =0 (i=1; 2). A con8guration (q; n1; n2) is reachable if (q0; 0; 0)
∗→(q; n1; n2). A
con8guration (q; n1; n2) is )nal if q∈QF . For two-counter machines it is undecidable
whether a 8nal con8guration is reachable (see, e.g., [22, p. 172]).
Next we describe an encoding of 2-counter machines into con8gurations. We assume
distinct constants C; C0; C1; D and a distinct constant q∈N for every state q∈Q. We
associate a message to every natural number as follows:
0 = E(C; C0)n+ 1 = E(n; C1):
We associate a message to every 2-counter machine’s con8guration as follows:
(q; n; n′) = E(〈n; n′〉; q):
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We associate to every rule of the 2-counter machine an iterated process. For instance,
consider the rule r≡ (0; 1; q; q′; 1;−1) which means that if the 8rst counter is null, the
second one is not null, and the machine is in state q then the machine can go to state
q′, add 1 to the 8rst counter, and subtract 1 to the second. This is encoded by the
process (by the way, here we could use tail recursive/8nite control processes rather
than iterated processes):
Pr ≡ it ?x = E(〈E(C; C0); E(y′; C1)〉; q):!E(〈E(E(C; C0); C1); y′〉; q′):0:
For each 8nal state q∈QF , we introduce the process:
Pq ≡?x = E(〈x; y〉; q):asrt(false):0:
The initial knowledge T0 of the adversary is the encoding of the initial con8guration:
T0 = {(q0; 0; 0)}. Finally, we associate to a 2-counter machine M a process PM
PM ≡ (q∈QF Pq|(r∈Q Pr
which eventually informs the adversary of (the translation of) every reachable con8g-
uration. Given this encoding, we note the following proposition (whose rather simple
proof is available in [5]).
Proposition 3.2. (1) (q0; 0; 0)
∗→(q; n; n′) i? for some P; T; (PM ; T0) ∗→(P; T ) and
(q; n; n′)∈T .
(2) A )nal con)guration is reachable i? (PM ; T0)
∗→ err.
The encoding of 2-counter machines makes an essential use of pairing. Indeed we
will show in Section 9 that without pairing the reachability problem for the simple
iterated processes considered above is decidable in polynomial time. Since the encoding
of satisfaction of CNF in Section 3.1 does not rely on pairing, it turns out that in this
particular case reachability is easier to check for iterated than for 8nite processes.
4. Symbolic analysis
In this section, we study the eLect of certain admissible substitutions on the synthesis
and analysis operators. Our analysis culminates in the decomposition Theorem 4.10
that makes it possible to compute on symbolic con8gurations, i.e., on con8gurations
containing free variables ranging over certain in8nite sets of messages. Let us point out
that the generalisation from ‘symmetric keys’ to ‘public keys’ is not straightforward.
In particular, the notion of irreducible set presented in [2] needs to be generalised to
the notion of (minimum) generator and the fact that we can actually compute this set
and with this set is not quite obvious as witnessed by Proposition 4.6 and Lemma 4.9.
Denition 4.1. Let T ⊆MV and K ⊆finN.
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(1) Suppose t ∈MV . We say that t′ is K-accessible in t iL either t≡ t′ or t≡〈t1; t2〉
and for some i∈{1; 2}; t′ is K-accessible in ti or t≡E(t1; C); Inv(C)∩K = ∅,
and t′ is K-accessible in t1.
(2) We de8ne PK (T ), the K-accessible parts of T , as the set of terms that are K-
accessible in a term t ∈T .
(3) We de8ne SK (T ), the K-synthesis of T , as the least set of terms that contains
T ∪K and is closed under pairing and encryption by a name in K .
(4) Finally, we de8ne K(T ) as the least set of names K such that C ∈PK (T ) implies
C ∈K .
Example 4.2. Suppose T = {C1; 〈E(C2; C1); E(E(C3; C3); C2)〉} where all keys are sym-
metric. Then P∅(T )∩N= {C1} and P{C1}(T )∩N= {C1; C2}=P{C1 ;C2}(T )∩N.
Hence, K(T )= {C1; C2}.
Proposition 4.3. Suppose T ⊆MV . Then:
(1) K(T )=A(T )∩N.
(2) A(T )=PK(T )(T ).
(3) S(A(T ))= SK(T )(PK(T )(T )).
Proof. We observe that the set K(T ) admits the following iterative de8nition:
K(T ) =
⋃
n∈!
K(T )n K(T )0 = P∅(T ) ∩N;
K(T )n+1 = K(T )n ∪ (PK(T )n(T ) ∩N):
We also note that PK (T )=
⋃
t∈T accK (t) where accK (t) is a set of terms de8ned in-
ductively on the structure of t:
accK (C) = C;
accK (x) = x;
accK (〈t1; t2〉) = {〈t1; t2}〉 ∪ accK (t1) ∪ accK (t2);
accK (E(t; C)) = {E(t; C)} ∪ accK (t) if Inv(C) ∩ K = ∅;
accK (E(t; C)) = {E(t; C)} if Inv(C) ∩ K = ∅:
Given this inductive characterisation the proof of (1–3) is rather direct (and available
in [5]).
Denition 4.4. Let T ⊆MV . We say that the set G is a generator for T if S(A(T ))=
S(G).
The proof of the following proposition relies on Propositions 2.1 and 4.3. In par-
ticular, for (4) we prove that t ∈ S(A(T )) implies t ∈ S(G ∩G′) by induction on the
structure of t (the proof is available in [5]).
Proposition 4.5. Suppose T ⊆MV and G;G′ are generators for T . Then:
(1) PK(T )(T ) is a generator for T .
(2) K(T )=G ∩N.
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(3) Var(T )=Var(S(A(T )))=Var(S(G))=Var(G).
(4) G ∩G′ is a generator for T .
From Proposition 4.5(4), we know that there exists a minimum generator. The
following proposition gives a method to compute it.
Proposition 4.6 (Minimum generator). Suppose T ⊃finMV . Then the application of
the following rules always terminates and computes the smallest generator for T that
we denote with G,(T ).
(a) {t} ∪ T → T if t ∈ S(T );
(b) {〈t; t′〉} ∪ T → {t; t′} ∪ T;
(c) {E(t; C)} ∪ T → {t; E(t; C)} ∪ T if T ∩ Inv(C) = ∅ and t ∈ S(T ):
Proof hint. Note that when we write {t}∪T on the left-hand side of a rule it is
intended that t ∈T . First we show by case analysis that if T1→T2 then (i) S(A(T1))=
S(A(T2)) and (ii) T1⊆ S(T2). The properties presented in Proposition 2.1 are useful
here. Termination is easily established.
Suppose T ∗→T ′ and T ′ is in normal form. To show that T ′ is the smallest generator
we prove 8rst by induction on n that A(T ′)n⊆ S(T ′). Then we observe:
S(A(T )) = S(A(T ′)) by (i)
= S(A(S(T ′))) by Proposition2:1(5)
= S(S(T ′) ∪ A(T ′)) by Proposition 2:1(4)
= S(S(T ′)) by A(T ′) ⊆ S(T ′)
= S(T ′) by Proposition2:1(2):
Suppose there exists G⊂T ′ such that S(G)= S(T ′)= S(A(T )). We choose t ∈T ′\G.
Then T ′=T ′′ ∪{t}; t ∈ S(T ′′)= S(G) and T ′→T ′′ by (a) which is a contradiction.
Thus T ′ is a minimal generator and from Proposition 4.5(4) it follows that it is
minimum.
Example 4.7. If we take T = {E(〈C1; x〉; C2); E(C1; C3); C3} with Inv(C2)= {C3} and
Inv(C3)= {C2} then G,(T )= {E(〈C1; x〉; C2); E(C1; C3); C1; C3; x} which is strictly
contained in A(T ).
Denition 4.8. (1) An environment E is a possibly empty list of the shape x1 : T1; : : : ;
xn :Tn where T1⊆ · · · ⊆Tn⊆finMV is a non-decreasing sequence of 8nite sets of open
messages and Var(Ti)⊆{x1; : : : ; xi−1}.
(2) A substitution  is admissible for the environment x1 : T1; : : : ; xn : Tn if
(xi) ∈ S(A((Ti))) for i = 1; : : : ; n;
(y) = y if y ∈ {x1; : : : ; xn}:
Lemma 4.9 (Symbolic representation). Let E≡ x1 :T1; : : : ; xn : Tn be an environment,
 be an admissible substitution for E, and Gi be a generator for Ti. Then:
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(1) K(Ti)=K(Ti).
(2) S(A(Ti))= S(A(Ti)).
(3) S(Gi)= S(Gi)= S((Gi\V )).
Proof hint. The full proof is given in Appendix A.1.
(1) It is easy to establish K(Ti)⊆K(Ti). To show the other inclusion, we prove
(1′) C ∈ accK(Ti)(xj)⇒ C ∈ K(Ti) if j ¡ i:
by induction on the pair (i; j) lexicographically ordered.
(2) Relying on Proposition 4.3(3) we prove S(A(Ti))⊆ S(A(Ti)). To show the
other inclusion, we prove by induction on i that
PK(Ti)(Ti) ⊆ SK(Ti)(PK(Ti)(Ti)):
(3) To prove S(Gi)= S(Gi) we recall Proposition 4.5(2) and proceed by induc-
tion on the structure of the term. To establish the equation S(Gi)= S((Gi\V )), we
prove by induction on j (j6i) that Vj ⊆ S((Gi\V )). From this we derive (Gi ∩
V )⊆ S((Gi\V )) that implies the desired property.
Theorem 4.10 (Decomposition). Let E≡ x1 : T1; : : : ; xn : Tn be an environment,  be
an admissible substitution, and Gi be a generator for Ti. Then:
(1) C ∈ S(A(Ti)) i? C ∈K(Ti).
(2) 〈t; t′〉 ∈ S(A(Ti)) i? t; t′ ∈ S(A(Ti)).
(3) E(t; C)∈ S(A(Ti)) i? ∃E(t′; C)∈Gi E(t; C)= (E(t′; C)) or
(C ∈K(Ti) and t ∈ S(A(Ti))).
Proof. (1) We observe:
C ∈ S(A(Ti)) iL C ∈ A(Ti) ∩N;
iL C ∈ K(Ti) iL C ∈ K(Ti):
(2) 〈t; t′〉 ∈ S(A(Ti))=A(S(A(Ti))) implies t; t′ ∈ S(A(Ti)) by de8nition of analy-
sis. Vice versa, t; t′ ∈ S(A(Ti))= S(S(A(Ti))) implies 〈t; t′〉 ∈ S(A(Ti)) by de8nition
of synthesis.
(3) (⇐) We consider the two cases.
• If E(t′; C)∈Gi then, by Lemma 4.9(2–3):
E(t′; C) ∈ Gi ⊆ S(Gi) = S(Gi) = S(A(Ti)) = S(A(Ti)):
• If C ∈K(Ti) and t ∈ S(A(Ti)) then E(t; C)∈ S(S(A(Ti)))= S(A(Ti)).
(⇒) Suppose E(t; C)∈ S(A(Ti)) and (C ∈K(Ti) or t ∈ S(A(Ti))). Then
S(A(Ti)) = S(A(Ti))= S(Gi) by Lemma 4:9(2)
= S(Gi) = S((Gi\V )) by Lemma 4:9(3):
We conclude that E(t; C)≡ E(t′; C) for some E(t′; C)∈Gi.
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(?s) (?x:P; T; E)→ (P; T; E; x : T )
(!s) (!t:P; T; E)→ (P; T ∪{t}; E)
(pls1) (x← prjl〈t; t′〉:P; T; E)→ ([t=x]P; T; E)
(pls2) (x← prjl(xi):P; T; E)→ [〈x; x′〉=xi](P; T; E) x′ fresh
(ds1) (dec(E(t; C); C
′):P; T; E)→ ([t=x]P; T; E) if C′ ∈ Inv(C)
(ds2) (x← dec(xi; C′):P; T; E)→ [E(x; C)=xi](P; T; E) if C ∈K(Ti);
C′ ∈ Inv(C)
(ds3) (dec(xi; C
′):P; T; E)→ [E(t; C)=xi]([t=x]P; T; E) if E(t; C)∈G,(Ti);
C′ ∈ Inv(C)
(as) (asrt(false):P; T; E)→ err
[〈x; x′〉=xi]E ≡ x1 : T1; : : : ; xi−1 : Ti−1; x : Ti; x′ : Ti;
xi+1 : [〈x; x′〉=xi]Ti+1; : : : ; xn : [〈x; x′〉=xi]Tn
[E(x; C)=xi]E ≡ x1 : T1; : : : ; xi−1 : Ti−1; x : Ti;
xi+1 : [E(x; C)=xi]Ti+1; : : : ; xn : [E(x; C)=xi]Tn
[E(t; C)=xi]E ≡ x1 : T1; : : : ; xi−1 : Ti−1;
xi+1 : [E(t; C)=xi]Ti+1; : : : ; xn : [E(t; C)=xi]Tn
Fig. 2. Basic symbolic reduction.
5. Basic symbolic reduction
In de8ning the symbolic reduction, our strategy is to maintain the constraints x1 :
T1; : : : ; xn : Tn in the form required to apply Theorem 4.10. In this section, we will just
consider simple processes P satisfying the following conditions:
(1) All terms occurring in P belong to MV (cf. Section 2).
(2) P does not contain the operators of parallel composition, conditional, and iteration.
(3) The only assertions allowed are of the form asrt(false).
Note that these conditions are preserved by reduction. We will see in Section 6 how
to lift restrictions (1–2) and in Section 7 how to handle more general assertions.
Denition 5.1. A symbolic con8guration is either err or a triple (P; T; E) where:
(1) P is a process and T is a non-empty 8nite set of terms in MV such that for some
set of variables {x1; : : : ; xn}; FV (P)∪Var(T )⊆{x1; : : : ; xn}.
(2) E≡ x1 :T1; : : : ; xn :Tn is an environment (cf. De8nition 4.8) such that T1 = ∅ if
E = ∅.
The basic rules for symbolic reduction are presented in Fig. 2 where the symmetric
rules for the right projection are omitted. We note that the rules (ds2;3) are not mutually
exclusive in the case where C∈K(T ) and Inv(C)∩K(T )= ∅. This case, which does
not arise in the symmetric case, corresponds to a situation where the adversary knows
C but not its inverses so that it can synthesise a message of the form E(t; C) but it is
unable to decrypt such a message.
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Let us examine the soundness and completeness of the symbolic reduction system.
Denition 5.2. Let c≡ (P; T; E) be a symbolic con8guration and  be a ground
substitution. If E≡ x1 :T1; : : : ; xn :Tn then we write  |=E iL (xi)∈ S(A(Ti)), for
i=1; : : : ; n.
The following Theorem 5.3 implies that a symbolic con8guration (P; T; ∅) reduces to
err iL the con8guration (P; T ) does. Moreover, all symbolic reductions are terminating
and 8nitely branching. This entails a simple decision procedure for the reachability
problem: explore all symbolic reductions and check whether they lead to the con8gu-
ration err.
Theorem 5.3. (1) Symbolic reduction always terminates. (2) (P; T; E) ∗→ err i? ∃
|=E (P; T ) ∗→ err.
Proof hint. This result is generalised in Theorem 6.13, to which we refer for a complete
proof.
(1) Symbolic reduction terminates because every rule decreases by one the number of
pre8xes in the process P.
(2) In both directions we proceed by induction on the length of the reduction to err. To
show completeness (implication ⇐) we rely on the decomposition Theorem 4.10.
We consider an example of application of the basic symbolic reduction procedure.
Example 5.4. We assume symmetric keys. Consider the process:
P1 ≡?x1:!E(x1; C1):?x2:x3 ← dec(x2; C1):x4 ← dec(x3; C0):asrt(false):0;
where initially T1 = {C0}. We show (P1; T1; ∅) ∗→ err. We have:
(P1; T1; ∅)
→ (!E(x1; C1) : : : ; T1; x1 : T1) by (?s)
→ (?x2: : : : ; T2; x1 : T1) where T2 = T1 ∪ {E(x1; C1)}; by (!s)
→ (x3 ← dec(x2; C1) : : : ; T2; E2) where E2 = x1 : T1; x2 : T2; by (?s)
→ [E(x1; C1)=x2]([x1=x3]x4 ← dec(x3; C0):asrt(false):0; T2; E2); by (ds3)
≡ (x4 ← dec(x1; C0):asrt(false):0; T2; x1 : T1); by substitution
→ (asrt(false):0; T2; x4 : T1); by (ds2)
→ err by (as):
Following the substitutions backwards, we can express the set of successful ‘attacks’
of the adversary as x1 =E(x4; C0); x2 =E(E(x4; C0); C1) where x4 ∈ S({C0}).
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6. Extensions of basic symbolic reduction
In this section, we lift the restrictions imposed in Section 5 thus de8ning a symbolic
reduction for the full process model introduced in Section 2.
6.1. Variables in key position
Let us denote with Varkey(t) the collection of variables x such that E(t′; x) is a
subterm of t and with MoV the collection of terms in T(V ) such that in every subterm
E(t′; t′′); t′′ is either a name or a variable.
Then consider a term t ∈T(V ), an environment E constraining the variables in
Var(t), and an admissible substitution  |=E. We observe that t ∈M iL t ∈MoV and
(xi)∈K(Ti) whenever xi ∈Varkey(t). We write 2↓(t; E) if:
(1) 2= id and t ∈MV or
(2) t ∈MoV ; Varkey(t)= {x1; : : : ; xm}; m¿1, and 2(xi)∈K(Ti), if xi ∈Varkey(t) and
2(xi)= xi, otherwise.
We note that for all t; E there are only a )nite number of substitutions 2 such that
2↓(t; E).
With this notation, we can write the rules for output, decryption, projection,: : : by
combining reduction and instantiation of variables in key position. For instance, the
rule (!s) becomes:
(!s) (!t:P; T; E)→ 2(P; T ∪ {t}; E) if 2 ↓ (t; E);
where, as expected, 2(P; T; E)= (2P; 2T; 2E) and the de8nition of [C=xi]E amounts to
remove the constraint xi : Ti and replace xi with C in E (cf. bottom of Fig. 4).
This treatment of variables in key position is simple but not completely satisfying
for practical purposes. Pragmatics is dealt with in Section 7.3.
6.2. Parallel composition and iteration
We can handle parallel composition and iteration along the lines of the non-symbolic
reduction system in Fig. 1. Namely, we assume that parallel composition is associative
and commutative and that P≡P | 0. Then, without loss of generality, we always reduce
the leftmost thread of a process and we suppose that there is at least another thread
running in parallel. Then, e.g., the rule for output is rewritten, once more, as follows:
(!s) (!t:P |P′; T; E)→ 2(P |P′; T ∪ {t}; E) if 2 ↓ (t; E):
The rule for iteration can be written along the pattern of rule (it) in Fig. 1. However, in
view of the undecidability result in Section 3.2 this is not very interesting. Summarising
our discussion, we present in Fig. 3 the symbolic reduction system not including the
rules for conditional and assertions. The system operates on quadruples (P; T; E; I)
where I is a 8nite set of inequalities whose introduction will be motivated in the
following Section 6.3. We denote with u either a name or a variable occurring in the
environment E.
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(?s) (?x:P |P′; T; E; I)→ (P |P′; T; E; x : T; I)
(!s) (!t:P |P′; T; E; I)→ 2(P |P′; T ∪{t}; E; I)
if 2 ↓ (t; E)
(pls1) (x← prjl(〈t; t′〉):P |P′; T; E; I)→ 2([t=x]P |P′; T; E; I)
if 2 ↓ (〈t; t′〉; E)
(pls2) (x← prjl(xi):P |P′; T; E; I)→ [〈x; x′〉=xi](P |P′; T; E; I)
x′fresh
(ds1) (x ← dec(E(t; u); u′):P |P′; T; E; I)→ 2([t=x]P |P′; T; E; I)
if 2 ↓ (E(E(t; u); u′); E); 2(u′)∈ Inv(2(u))
(ds2) (x← dec(xi; u):P |P′; T; E; I)→ ([E(x; C)=xi] comp 2)(P |P′; T; E; I)
if 2 ↓ (E(u; u); E); C ∈K(2Ti); u = xi and 2(u)∈ Inv(C)
(ds3) (x← dec(xi; u):P |P′; T; E; I)→ ([E(t; C)=xi] comp 2)([t=x]P |P′; T; E; I)
if 2 ↓ (E(u; u); E); E(t; C)∈G,(2Ti); u = xi and 2(u)∈ Inv(C):
Fig. 3. Symbolic reduction (without conditional and assertions).
6.3. Conditional
The symbolic handling of the conditional is the most technical extension we consider.
We start by enriching a symbolic con8guration with a fourth component I which is a 8-
nite set of inequalities s = t where s; t ∈MV . We write I↓ if for no t; t = t ∈ I and in this
case we say that I is consistent. Consider a con8guration c≡ (asrt(false):P |P′; T; E; I).
Then it is correct to reduce c to err iL I↓. Indeed, in this case we can always build a
substitution  such that  |=E; I exploiting the fact that the variables range over in)nite
sets of messages (a proof is available in [5]).
Proposition 6.1. Let (P; T; E; I) be a symbolic con)guration. If I↓ then ∃  |=E; I .
Given Proposition 6.1 above, we can rewrite the rule (as) in Fig. 2 as follows:
(as) (asrt(false):P |P′; T; E; I)→ err if I ↓ :
In general, we note that it is useless to evaluate a con8guration (P; T; E; I) such that
I is not consistent. We can now present in Fig. 4 the rules to handle the conditional.
Rules (ms1) and (m
s
2) assign a name to each variable in key position (cf. Section 6.1)
and respectively handle equality and inequality (they are the symbolic counterpart of
(m1) and (m2)). The rule (ms1) relies on the rules (e
s
1–7) to check the satis8ability of
the equality (strictly speaking, we should consider [s= t]P as a special syntax for a
conditional without else branch). The rules (es1–7) operate on triples (Eq; E; 4), where
Eq is a possibly empty list of equations among terms in MV , E is an environment,
and 4 keeps track of the substitutions performed. Basically, the rules (es1–7) perform
a variant of syntactic uni8cation on the equations Eq which is compatible with the
set-membership constraints E. Rules (es1–3) should be self-explanatory and rules (e
s
4–7)
are a direct application of the decomposition Theorem 4.10.
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(ms1) ([s = t]P1; P2; T; E; I)→ (4 ◦ 2)(P1; T; E; I)
if 2 ↓ (〈s; t〉; E) and ([2s = 2t]; 2E; id) ∗→(∅; E′; 4)
(ms2) ([s = t]P1; P2; T; E; I)→ 2(P2; T; E; I ∪ {s = t})
if 2 ↓ (〈s; t〉; E)
(es1) ([f(˜t) = f(t˜′)]Eq; E; 4)→ ([t=˜s]Eq; E; 4)f constr:
(es2) ([xi = xi]Eq; E; 4)→ (Eq; E; 4)
(es3) ([xi = xj]Eq; E; 4)→ (4′Eq; 4′E; 4′ ◦ 4) if i ¡ j; 4′ = [xi=xj]
(es4) ([xi = C]Eq; E; 4)→ (4′Eq; 4′E; 4′ ◦ 4) if C ∈ K(Ti); 4′ = [C=xi]
(es5) ([xi = 〈t1; t2〉]Eq; E; 4)→ ([x′ = t1][x′′ = t2]4′Eq; 4′E; 4′ ◦ 4)
if xi =∈ Var(〈t1; t2〉); 4′ = [〈x′; x′′〉=xi]
(es6) ([xi = E(t; C)]Eq; E; 4)→ ([x = t]4′Eq; 4′E; 4′ ◦ 4)
if xi =∈ Var(t); C ∈ K(Ti); 4′ = [E(x; C)=xi]
(es7) ([xi = E(t; C)]Eq; E; 4)→ ([t = t′]4′Eq; 4′E; 4′ ◦ 4)
if xi =∈ Var(t); E(t′; C) ∈ G,(Ti); 4′ = [E(t′; C)=xi]
[xi=xj]E ≡ x1 : T1; : : : ; xj−1 : Tj−1;
xj+1 : [xi=xj]Tj+1; : : : ; xn : [xi=xj]Tn
[C=xi]E ≡ x1 : T1; : : : ; xi−1 : Ti−1;
xi+1 : [C=xi]Ti+1; : : : ; xn : [C=xi]Tn:
Fig. 4. Symbolic reduction for conditional.
We denote with 4(P; T; E; I) the con8guration (4P; 4T; 4E; 4I) where 4 is the com-
position of ‘basic’ substitutions 41 ◦ · · · ◦ 4n and 4E stands for 41(· · · (4nE) · · ·) (the
application of ‘basic’ substitutions to an environment is de8ned at the bottom of
Figs. 2 and 4).
Next, we adapt a method introduced in [2], to show that the rules (es1–7) always
terminate and give a sound and complete method to check the satis8ability of a list of
equations subject to the set-membership constraints E.
Denition 6.2. Given a triple (Eq; E; 4), we associate a rank rk(x) to every variable
x occurring in an environment E′ such that (Eq; E; 4) ∗→ (Eq′; E′; 4′) as follows: if the
variable is in E then its rank is its position in E, otherwise the variable inherits the
rank of the variable it replaces according to the de8nition of [t=x]E in Figs. 2 and 4.
We note that the maximal rank of a variable occurring in a pair (Eq′; E′) reachable
from (Eq; E) is bound by the size of the list E.
Assume every variable is assigned a rank ranging between 1 and n. Then we de8ne
the rank of a term t as 0 if the term is closed and i if i is the maximal rank of a
variable occurring in t. We de8ne the complexity of an equation [s= t] with respect
to the maximal rank n as
,([s = t]) = (rn; : : : ; r1;max(|s|; |t|)); (1)
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where ri is the number of occurrences of variables of rank i in [s= t], and |s| is the
number of symbols in s. We de8ne a well-founded partial ordering on triples by setting
([s = t]Eq; E; 4)  ([s′ = t′]Eq′; E′; 4′) iL ,([s = t]) ¿ ,([s′ = t′]); (2)
where ¿ denotes the lexicographic ordering. Remark that this ordering is not a lexico-
graphic extension of the ordering on equations to sequences of equations (which is not
well-founded), for instance pairs with an empty sequence of equations are incomparable
with any other pair.
The domain of a substitution  is the set Dom()= {x | x ≡ x}. We say that a
substitution  is decreasing if ∀x∈Dom()rk(x)¿rk(x). For instance, the identity
substitution is decreasing since its domain is empty. We note the following properties
of decreasing substitutions.
Lemma 6.3. (1) The composition of decreasing substitutions is a decreasing substi-
tution.
(2) If  is decreasing then either [t= t′]≡ [t= t′] or ,([t= t′])¿,([t= t′]).
(3) The composition  ◦ [t=x] of a decreasing substitution  and of the substitution
[t=x] is decreasing if for all y∈Var(t), rk(y)¿rk(x) and y∈Dom().
Proof hint. (1) ∀y∈Var(1(x)), rk(x)¿rk(y) and either 2(y)=y or ∀z ∈Var(2(y))
we have rk(x)¿rk(y)¿rk(z) since 2 decreasing.
(2) For an equation [t= t′] either no variable is in Dom() or at least one is replaced
by occurrences of smaller variables, thus decreasing the complexity measure of the
equation.
(3) The composition yields (y) for y = x, and (t) for x. Since each variable of t
is in Dom() it is instantiated by  yielding variables of a smaller rank (hence smaller
than the rank of x since rk(y)¿rk(x)).
The termination of rules (e1–7) in Fig. 4 relies on the following technical lemma
proven in Section A.2 by induction on the order .
Lemma 6.4 (Termination). Let p≡ ([s= t]Eq; E; 4) be a triple which is reduced by
rules (es1–7). Then two cases can arise: either p
∗→ ([s′= t′]Eq′; E′; 4′) and no rule
applies, or we can reduce p to a con)guration (Eq′; E′; 4′)≡ (Eq; E; 4), where 
satis)es: (i)  is decreasing, (ii) if s≡ x and t =∈V then x∈Dom().
By iterating Lemma 6.4, we can conclude that equations can be eliminated.
Proposition 6.5. The simpli)cation of triples (Eq; E; 4) always terminates.
Concerning soundness and completeness we note the following proposition.
Proposition 6.6. (1) If ([s= t]; Eq; E; 4)→ ([s =˜ t]4′Eq; 4′E; 4′ ◦4) and  |= [s =˜ t]4′Eq
and  |= 4′E then  ◦ 4′ |= [s= t]; Eq; E.
R.M. Amadio et al. / Theoretical Computer Science 290 (2003) 695–740 713
(2) If  |= [s= t]; Eq; E then ([s= t]; Eq; E; 4)→ ([s =˜ t]4′Eq; 4′E; 4′ ◦4) and there is
a ′ such that ′ |= [s =˜ t]4′Eq; 4′E and = ′ ◦ 4′.
Proof hint. (1) We proceed by case analysis on the rule applied. We consider a typical
case.
(es6) We know  |= [x= t]4′Eq; 4′E, 4′= [E(x; C)=xi], xi =∈Var(t), and C ∈K(Ti). Ob-
viously  ◦ 4′ |=Eq. Moreover, since (x)= t and xi =∈Var(t) it follows that  ◦
[E(x; C)=xi] |= xi =E(t; C).
It remains to prove that  ◦ 4′ |=E. Suppose E≡ x1 : T1; : : : ; xi : Ti; : : : ; xn : Tn. We
distinguish three cases:
(j¡i) Then (4′(xj))= (xj), (4′Tj)= (Tj), and we know that (xj)∈ S(A(Tj))
since  |= 4′E.
(j= i) Then (4′(xi))=E(t; C) and (4′Ti)= (Ti). Then (x)= t ∈ S(A(Ti))
since  |= 4′E, and E(t; C)∈ S(A(Ti)) since C ∈K(Ti).
(j¿i) Then (4′(xj))= (xj) and (xj)∈ S(A((4′(Tj)))) since  |= 4′E.
(2) We consider the structure of s= t knowing that  |= s= t. For all possible cases,
we verify that a rule applies (up to symmetry). The substitution ′ is de8ned as follows:
(es1) 
′ = id (es2) 
′ = id
(es3) 
′ = [xj=xj] (es4) 
′ = [xi=xi]
(es5) 
′ = [t′1=x
′; t′2=x
′′; xi=xi] (es6) 
′ = [t′=x; xi=xi]
(es7) 
′ = [xi=xi]):
From Proposition 6.6 above we derive the following properties.
Corollary 6.7. (1) If ([s= t]; E; id) ∗→ (∅; E′; 4) and  |=E′ then  ◦ 4 |= [s= t]; E.
(2) If  |= [s= t]; E then ([s= t]; E; id) ∗→ (∅; E′; 4′) and there is a ′ such that
′ |=E′ and = ′ ◦ 4′.
Proof hint. For (1) iterate Proposition 6.6(1) and for (2) iterate Proposition 6.6(2).
6.4. Soundness and completeness
We have formulated the symbolic reduction rules so that they are in lockstep with the
reduction rules. This leads to a modular and simple approach to the proof of soundness
and completeness which is presented next.
Denition 6.8. Given a set of transition rules R and a con8guration k, we de8ne
SuccR(k) = {k ′ | k r→ k ′ and r ∈ R}:
We de8ne in a similar way a successor function for symbolic con8gurations:
SuccR
s
s (c) = {c′ | c r→ c′ and r ∈ Rs}:
These functions are extended canonically on con8guration sets.
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Denition 6.9. Given a symbolic con8guration c≡ (P; T; E; I), the image of c, noted
Im(c) is the set {(P; T ) |  |=E; I}. Moreover, we de8ne Im(err)= {err}. We extend
Im on a set of symbolic con8gurations C by Im(C)=
⋃
c∈C Im(c).
Denition 6.10 (Symbolic equivalent). Given two transition sets R and Rs respec-
tively on con8gurations and symbolic con8gurations, we say that Rs is a symbolic
equivalent of R if
∀c ≡ (P; T; E; I) Im(SuccRss (c)) = SuccR(Im(c)):
The following lemma presents the properties of symbolic equivalence with respect
to union and composition (the proof is immediate).
Lemma 6.11. (1) If Rs1 is a symbolic equivalent of R1 and R
s
2 is a symbolic equivalent
of R2 then Rs1 ∪Rs2 is a symbolic equivalent of R1 ∪R2.
(2) If Rs is a symbolic equivalent of R then for all n¿1 and every symbolic
con)guration c we have:
Im((SuccR
s
s )
n(c)) = (SuccR)n(Im(c)):
Then a rather long case analysis presented in Appendix A.3 allows to derive the
following result.
Proposition 6.12. In the following cases, Rs is a symbolic equivalent of R.
(1) R = {?};Rs = {?s} (2) R = {!};Rs = {!s}
(3) R = {d};Rs = {ds1; ds2; ds3} (4) R = {pl};Rs = {pls1; pls2}
(5) R = {m1};Rs = {ms1} (6) R = {m2};Rs = {ms2}
(7) R = {a};Rs = {as}:
From this, we derive the generalization of Theorem 5.3 on the soundness and com-
pleteness of the symbolic reduction.
Theorem 6.13. (1) Symbolic reduction always terminates.
(2) (P; T; E; I) ∗→ err i? ∃ |=E; I (P; T ) ∗→ err.
Proof. (1) By Proposition 6.5.
(2) We consider the full set of rules R= {?; !; d; pl;m1;m2; a1; a2} and Rs = {?s;
!s; ds1; d
s
2; d
s
3; pl
s
1; pl
s
2;m
s
1;m
s
2; a
s}. We note that Im((P; T; ∅; ∅))= {(P; T )} and Im(Succns
((P; T; ∅; ∅)))=Succn(Im((P; T; ∅; ∅)))=Succn((P; T )) and therefore:
(P; T ) ∗→ err iL ∃n err ∈ Succn((P; T ))
iL ∃n err ∈ Im(Succns ((P; T; ∅; ∅)))
iL ∃n err ∈ Succns ((P; T; ∅; ∅))
iL (P; T; ∅; ∅) ∗→ err:
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7. Assertions
As shown in [3], the combination of the conditional and the assertion asrt(false)
already allows to express secrecy and authentication properties. Nevertheless expressing
authentication in this way is rather cumbersome. In order to obtain simpler speci8ca-
tions, we introduce a predicate known(t) which is de8ned by
|=T known(t) iL t ∈ S(A(T )):
For instance, to verify an authentication property we proceed as follows: (i) when emit-
ting a message subject to authentication we store it, in a crypted form, in the knowledge
of the adversary, and (ii) upon reception we authenticate a message by checking with
the predicate known that it was stored, and hence emitted, in the knowledge of the
adversary. More details on the use of assertions to verify security properties will be
given in Section 7.2.
In the following, the full assertion language we will consider is the following:
’ ::= true |false | t = t′ | t = t′ | known(t) | secret(t) |’1 ∧ ’2 |’1 ∨ ’2
where:
|=T true |=T t = t′ iL t ≡ t′
|=T t = t′ iL t ≡ t′ |=T known(t) iL t ∈ S(A(T ))
|=T secret(t) iL t = S(A(T )) |=T ’1 ∧ ’2 iL |=T ’1 and |=T ’2
|=T ’1 ∨ ’2 iL |=T ’1 or |=T ’2:
This is equivalent to saying that we consider arbitrary boolean combinations of atomic
formulas checking the equality of two messages t= t′ and the secrecy of a message
secret(t) with respect to the current knowledge of the adversary.
7.1. Symbolic reduction of assertions
To check symbolically the validity of an assertion we proceed as follows. Without
loss of generality, we suppose that the formula ’ is presented in conjunctive normal
formal. Then we take the negation of the assertion and check its satis8ability by
reducing it to a reachability problem for a program with a certain structure. To this
end, it is convenient to introduce a test [secret(X )]P whose reduction and symbolic
reduction are de8ned below (the test [secret(X )] is only used to compile the assertions
and it is not part of the oRcial syntax of processes).
Denition 7.1. If X is a set of terms (X may be empty):
(sc) ([secret(X )]P |P′; T )→ (P |P′; T )
if ∀t ∈ X t =∈ S(A(T ))
(scs) ([secret(X )]P |P′; T; E; I)→ (P |P′; T; E; I)
if I ↓;∀t ∈ X t =∈ S(G,(T ) ∪ Var(E)):
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We note that rule (scs) will always test the condition I ↓. We can express the
relationship between rules (scs) and (sc) as follows (the proof is presented in Appendix
A.4).
Proposition 7.2. Let c be a symbolic con)guration. Then:
Succ{sc
s}
s (c) = ∅ i? Succ{sc}(Im(c)) = ∅:
This formula still holds for any set of symbolic con)gurations.
Next we de8ne an auxiliary symbolic con8guration corresponding to a formula ’
with no conjunction.
Denition 7.3. Let (P; T; E; I) be a symbolic con8guration and ’ be a disjunction of
tests of the shape:
’ =
∨
i=1;:::;m
secret(ti) ∨
∨
j=1;:::;n
(rj = r′j) ∨
∨
k=1;:::;p
(sk = s′k) ∨
∨
l=1;:::;q
known(t′l):
We de8ne the symbolic con8guration c(’)(T;E; I) as:
c(’)(T;E;I) ≡ (?x1: · · · :?xm:[x1 = t1] · · · [xm = tm]
[r1 = r′1] · · · [rn = r′n]
[s1 = s′1] · · · [sp = s′p]
[secret({t′1; : : : ; t′q})]0; T; E; I):
We point out that if ’ does not contain any known(t′l) predicate, c(’)(T;E; I) must
end with a secret(∅) construct. With these notations, the length of c(’) is then de8ned
by: |c(’)|=2m+ n+ o+ 1.
The idea behind c(’)(T;E; I) is that this (symbolic) con8guration will test the negation
of ’. Namely, it will be able to reduce to a con8guration (0; T ′; E′; I ′) iL there exists
 |=E; I such that the assertion asrt(’) with the adversary knowledge T is false.
We write  |=T ’ as a shortcut for |=(T ) (’).
Proposition 7.4. Let ’ be a disjunction of equality, inequality, secret, and known
predicates (as given in De)nition 7.3). Then:
(∀ |= E; I  |=T ’) i? (Succ)|c(’)|(Im(c(’))) = ∅:
Proof hint. We just have to write the constraints associated with a ground reduction
of an element of Im(c(’)) and notice that there exists such a reduction iL there exists
 |=E; I such that  |=T ’.
We can now derive a result that leads to a symbolic reduction rule for assertions.
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Corollary 7.5. If ’ is a disjunction of equality, inequality, secret, and known predi-
cates, then:
(∀ |= E; I  |=T ’) i? ∃(T ′; E′; I ′)c(’)(T;E;I) ∗→(0; T ′; E′; I ′):
Proof. We note k = |c(’)| − 1.
(∀ |= E; I  |=T ’) iL (Succ)k+1(Im(c(’))) = ∅ by Proposition 7:4
iL Succ{sc}((Succ)k(Im(c(’)))) = ∅
iL Succ{sc}(Im(Succks (c(’)))) = ∅ by Lemma 6:11
iL Succ{sc}s (Succ
k
s (c(’))) = ∅ by Proposition 7:2
iL (Succs)k+1(c(’)) = ∅:
We conclude by noticing that condition (Succs)k+1(c(’))= ∅ is equivalent to c(’) ∗→
(0; T ′; E′; I ′).
We now have all necessary tools to introduce a function eval(T;E; I) that, given the
adversary knowledge T and the constraints E; I , symbolically evaluates an assertion.
Denition 7.6. Let ’ be an assertion. We denote by red(’) the formula ’ in ‘reduced’
conjunctive normal form so that red(’) ::= true |false |’1 ∧ · · · ∧’n where ’1; : : : ; ’n
are disjunctions of equality, inequality, secret, and known predicates. We de8ne the
symbolic evaluation of ’ in (T; E; I) as follows:
eval(’)(T;E;I) =


false if red(’) = ’1 ∧ · · · ∧ ’n and ∃i c(’i)(T;E;I) ∗→(0; T ′; E′; I ′)
or
red(’) = false and I ↓
true otherwise:
From Corollary 7.5, it is easy to derive the following result.
Corollary 7.7. Let ’ be an assertion. Then:
(∀ |= E; I  |=T ’) i? eval(’)(T;E;I) = true:
We can now present the new symbolic reduction rule for assertions.
Denition 7.8.
(as) (asrt(’):P |P′; T; E; I)→
{
err if eval(’)(T;E;I) = false;
(P |P′; T; E; I) otherwise:
This rule obviously preserves the termination property. It remains to show soundness
and completeness for the full system including the new assertion rule.
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Theorem 7.9 (Soundness and completeness). Let (P; T; E; I) be a symbolic con)gura-
tion. Then:
(P; T; E; I) ∗→ err i? ∃ |= E; I (P; T ) ∗→ err:
Proof. It follows from de8nition of (as) and Corollary 7.5 that:{
err ∈ Succ{as}s (c) iL err ∈ Succ{a}(Im(c));
err =∈ Succ{as}s (c) implies Im(Succ{a
s}
s (c)) = Succ
{a}(Im(c)):
We combine this fact with Proposition 6.12 (symbolic equivalence for all rules but the
pair a; as) to show by induction on n:
err =∈
n⋃
i=1
Succi(Im(c)) implies Succn(Im(c)) = Im(Succns (c)):
From this, we deduce:
err ∈
n⋃
i=1
Succi(Im(c)) iL err ∈
n⋃
i=1
Im(Succis(c)):
And this last property implies:
(P; T; E; I) ∗→ err iL ∃ |= E; I (P; T ) ∗→ err:
7.2. From security properties to assertions
The system of assertions provides a natural and powerful way to specify the security
properties expected from a protocol. Secrecy (also known as con8dentiality) properties
require that some information is not known by the adversary at some point of the
control. These properties are handled in a straightforward way by the secret predicate.
In the following section we will focus on so called authentication properties. Ver-
ifying authentication properties usually amounts to checking that in every run of the
protocol if some event A occurs then another event B has already occurred, e.g., if the
initiator has just 8nished his run of the protocol by receiving the last message from
the responder then indeed the responder has 8nished his run of the protocol.
We represent this speci8cation as follows. Whenever an expected event B occurs,
we store it in the knowledge of the adversary, i.e. we output the information encrypted
under some reserved key. Then, when an event A occurs, we use the known predicate
to check whether the event B has already occurred.
We will now detail the treatment of various forms of authentication presented in
Lowe’s hierarchy [26]. We take as running example the same 3 messages version of
the Needham–Schroeder public key protocol considered in his paper:
(1) A → B : {na; A}Pub(B);
(2) B → A : {na; nb}Pub(A);
(3) A → B : {nb}Pub(B):
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This (popular) notation describes two roles: the initiator (A) and the responder (B).
Correspondingly, we introduce two processes Init and Resp whose behaviour depends
on some variables ranging over 8nite domains of principals’ identi8ers. The cardinality
of the domains represents the number of principals playing each role; our veri8er
generates all possible combinations.
Init(myid ; resp) : Resp(myid ; init) :
(: na): (: nb):
(1) !E(〈na;myid〉; Pub(resp)): ?e:〈na; a〉←dec(e; Priv(myid)):
[a = init]:
(2) ?e:〈na′; nb〉 ← dec(e; Priv(myid)):[na′ = na]: !aE(nb; Pub(init)):
(3) !aE(nb; Pub(resp)):0 ?e′:[e′ = E(nb; Pub(myid))]:0:
The operators (: na) and (: nb) are compiled as explained in Remark 2.4 by gen-
erating fresh constants. The outputs denoted !amsg will be the ones used for authen-
tication (usually, this will be, for each participant, the last message sent in his run
of the protocol). These decorated outputs are expanded into standard outputs of the
shape !〈E(msgauth ; Kauth); msg〉 where Kauth is a fresh key and msgauth a particular mes-
sage whose content will depend on the form of authentication we want to check. The
participant willing to check the authentication property will then expect a message
E(msgauth ; Kauth) to be known by the environment. Note that we will only detail au-
thentication from the responder to the initiator, the other case being symmetric.
(1) Aliveness: the initiator wants to be convinced that the responder has been running
the protocol.
(2) Weak agreement: if an initiator A completes a run of the protocol, apparently with
responder B, then B has previously been running the protocol, apparently with A.
(3) Agreement: we also require that the initiator and the responder agree on the data
values of the data exchanged. In our case, we will require agreement on the
nonces na and nb. This also ensures that whenever the assertion holds, we have
an injective agreement.
Then msgauth in the code of the Responder is:
(1) myid ; (2) 〈myid ; init〉; (3) 〈myid ; init; na; nb〉
and the last line of the Initiator ends with asrt(known(E(t; Kauth))):0 where t is:
(1) resp; (2) 〈resp;myid〉 (3) 〈resp;myid ; na; nb〉:
7.3. A prototype implementation
The symbolic reduction system we have described forms the basis of a prototype
veri8er developed in CAML by one of the authors [32].
In order to achieve good performance, the veri8er uses several techniques, among
which:
• Depth-8rst search, to avoid excessive memory consumption.
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protocol # initiators # responders # servers time
yahalom 1 2 1 0:20 s
yahalom 2 2 2 47 s
needham-schroeder 1 1 3 0:05 s
needham-schroeder 2 2 3 3:96 s
otway-rees 1 1 1 0:02 s
otway-rees 2 2 2 1:17 s
otway-rees 3 3 3 3871 s
Fig. 5. Times for the analysis of various protocol.
• The pruning of equivalent schedulings of parallel processes by exploiting symmetry
in the system (injective renamings) and using an eager reduction method which only
explores non-commutative interleavings.
• Carefully choosen algorithmic structures that allow for incremental computation and
shared representation of terms.
As a result the current version has a speed-up with respect to our 8rst ‘naive’ pro-
totype which is greater than 500. Of course, the time required to do a full search (not
stopping at the 8rst error found) is heavily dependent on the modelling of the proto-
col. In 8rst approximation, we can say that one-session runs of typical protocols from
the literature are usually performed in less than 0:1 s, and two sessions within a few
seconds. Fig. 5 gives some 8gures for the full analysis of some typical protocols (a
full speci8cation example and the outcome of—an earlier version of—our analyser is
described in [5]). The protocols are de8ned using roles which are parametric processes
of the type presented in Section 7.2. The parameters range over 8nite sets of princi-
pals’ names and are automatically instantiated by the veri8er. For each role (initiator,
responder, server) the table reports the number of participants.
All measures were done on a Pentium II at 266 MHz, on which the tool performs
more than 250 000 basic symbolic reductions per second; the total time spent is more
or less proportional to the number of reductions done, and, for instance, when verifying
3 interleaved sessions of the Otway–Rees protocol, the veri8er indeed performs a bit
more than 109 reductions. An interesting feature is that in practice the memory usage
is almost constant and quite small (around 1MByte for all protocols tested so far), so
8nding an error in a protocol is mainly a matter of time (and patience).
7.3.1. Variables in key position
Our analyser also performs lazy instantiation of variables in key position. This
amounts to add in the environment E constraints x : K meaning that x ranges over
a 8nite set of constants K . The symbolic reduction rules can be adapted to environ-
ments having this more general form (this is straightforward for symmetric keys and
a bit more technical for public keys).
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We have implemented this extension, however the brute force expansion presented in
Section 6.1 may be just as good! Indeed, an important observation is that—in practice—
variables in key position are quite often automatically instantiated in the symbolic
reduction procedure before they need to be evaluated. This empirical remark can be
related to the fact that correct protocols will not encrypt messages with a name chosen
by the adversary and, conversely, that reaching a point in the symbolic reduction where
a process writes a term encrypted by a variable often means that we found a 6aw in
the protocol.
Let us have a look at a typical example, where principal A receives a key kab from
the server and wants to send some data to B using that key:
?e:kab ← dec(e; Kas):!E(Data; kab) : : : :
If we suppose that Data was meant to stay secret and that the protocol is indeed correct,
then at the time we encounter the !E(Data; kab) in the symbolic reduction, the variable
kab will already have been instantiated. It is easy to check that the instantiation will
happen whenever the environment does not know Kas but only some term E(C; Kas),
where C is some key that was previously generated by the server.
8. NP-completeness
In this section, we argue that a signi8cant fragment of the symbolic reduction sys-
tem can be implemented to run in NPTIME thus matching the lower bound proved in
Section 3. This result was conjectured in [4]. Independently, Rusinowitch and Turuani
[31] have obtained an NP-completeness result for a related system (still unpublished).
Their approach is quite diLerent from ours, in particular it does not rely on symbolic
reduction. An advantage of their approach is that it handles more general cases such
as complex symmetric keys. A disadvantage is that it relies more than ours on non-
deterministic choice and therefore it seems to lead to less eRcient implementations.
If we restrict our attention to symmetric keys and the parallel composition of pro-
cesses of the shape: ?x=E(: : : E(y; C1); : : : ; Cn):Q where Q can be !E(: : : E(y;D1); : : : ;
Dm):0, !E(: : : E(D;D1); : : : ; Dm):0, or asrt(false):0 then a rather straightforward imple-
mentation of symbolic reduction entails the following result.
Proposition 8.1. The reachability problem for processes of the shape above is
NP-complete.
Proof. We have shown in Section 3.1 that the problem in NP-hard. Next we show that
the symbolic reduction system can be implemented to solve the problem in NPTIME. Let
K be the 8nite set of constants occurring in the initial con8guration (P; T0). We adopt
the following abbreviations:
Cn : : : C1y for E(: : : E(y; C1); : : : ; Cn);
Cn : : : C1C for E(: : : E(C; C1); : : : ; Cn)
and denote with <; = 8nite words over K .
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Given a program P of the shape above, we guess in polynomial time an execution
schedule. We then obtain a sequential thread of the shape:
Pk ≡?xk = <kyk :!=k(yk): : : :?xm−1 = <m−1ym−1:!=m−1(ym−1):?xm
= <mym:asrt(false):0;
where k6m and initially k =0. The (yj) in the output !=j(yj) is optional.
Suppose (P0; T0; ∅) ∗→ (Pk; Tk ; Ek) and suppose the head of Pk has the shape ?xk =
<kyk :!=kyk (the case ?xk = <kyk :!=k is similar). We distinguish the following cases:
<k ∈K(Tk)∗. This means that the pre8x <k and yk can be synthesised by the adver-
sary. Two cases may arise:
=k ∈K(Tk)∗. Then we reduce to (Pk+1; Tk ; Ek) since =kyk can be synthesised from Tk .
=k = =′C=′′; =′ ∈K(Tk)∗; C =∈K(Tk). Then we reduce to (Pk+1; Tk ∪{C=′′yk}; Ek ;
yk : Tk).
<k = <′C<′′; <′ ∈K(Tk)∗; C =∈K(Tk). We select non-deterministically C<′′t ∈G,(Tk)
(if no such term exists we are done). As above, two cases may arise:
=k ∈K(Tk)∗. Then we reduce to (Pk+1; Tk ∪{t}; Ek).
=k = =′C=′′; =′ ∈K(Tk)∗; C =∈K(Tk). Then we reduce to (Pk+1; Tk ∪{C=′′t}; Ek).
We note that the symbolic reduction maintains the invariant that the size of Tk repre-
sented as a directed acyclic graph (dag) is bound by the size of T0 ∪{=0(y0); : : : ; =m−1
(ym−1)} which is bound in turn by the size of the initial con8guration. Since the com-
putation of K(Tk) and G,(Tk) can be implemented to run in deterministic polynomial
time, we have shown that the reachability of the invalid assertion can be checked in
NPTIME.
In the following, we present in a semi-formal style a generalisation of this result.
We consider again symmetric keys and programs of the shape:
!o1:?x = i1:!o2:?x = i2: : : :!on:?x = in:asrt(false):0 (3)
As in Section 3, the notation ?x= i stands for the input of a message which is 8ltered
against a pattern i. In what follows, i does not need to be linear (non-linear patterns can
be compiled into our basic formalism using the conditional). We assume that variables
bound by the 8lters have been renamed so that:
Var(ik) ∩ (Var(i1) ∪ · · · ∪ Var(ik−1)) = ∅:
The variables in the output messages satisfy the condition:
Var(ok) ⊆ Var(i1) ∪ · · · ∪ Var(ik−1):
As in Proposition 8.1, we can extend the decision procedure to the parallel composition
of programs of the shape (3) without aLecting the complexity class. To do this, we
guess non-deterministically the interleaving of the output–input actions.
As pointed out in Section 6, our symbolic reduction procedure is basically a variant
of syntactic uni8cation which is compatible with certain set-membership constraints.
Our data structures and algorithms are directly inspired by those proposed for (polyno-
mial time) syntactic uni8cation in [15] (see also [7] for a more accessible reference).
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In this approach, terms are represented as dags with shared variables, i.e. a variable
occurring in the terms is represented by exactly one node.
Data types. We rely on three record data types.
term = record term_list = record term_list_tag = record
{isvar : bool, {tr : term, {tp : term,
is : term, next : term} pred : term,
stamp : nat, tag : nat}
fn : string,
arg : term_list,
cstr : term_list_tag}
To each node we associate a record of type term. The 8eld isvar is a boolean
specifying whether the term is a variable. The 8eld is is a pointer to another term. It
is initialised to nil and it allows to share terms during the uni8cation procedure. The
counter stamp is utilised in the occur check (to avoid visiting a term several times)
and it is initialised to 0. The string fn represents a function symbol. In our case either
a pair pair, or an encryption function E( ,C), or a constant C. The pointer arg points
to a list of terms of record type term list representing the arguments of the function.
Here, tr is the pointer to the term and next is the pointer to the next term in the list.
Finally, the pointer cstr points to a list of terms which represents the knowledge of
the adversary. In our case, the current knowledge is given by the sets Ti = {o1; : : : ; oi},
i=1 : : : ; n which is a list of terms tagged by a natural number. We assume that the
8rst element tagged i points to oi and the last element tagged 1 points to o1. The 8eld
pred is employed to scan the list.
Initialization and main program. In a program of the shape (3), an erroneous
con8guration is reachable if and only if the following set-membership constraints
can be satis8ed:
i1 ∈ S(A(T1)); : : : ; in ∈ S(A(Tn)): (4)
Initially, we build the dags corresponding to the terms i1; : : : ; in; o1; : : : ; on and the lists
T1; : : : ; Tn. We denote with v be number of vertices and e the number of edges of the
resulting dag. To check the satis8ability of the condition (4) the main program calls
the procedure C (described next) on each pair term-constraint:
C(i1; T1); : : : ; C(in; Tn); true: (5)
Constraint-propagation. We present the procedure C in Fig. 6. The basic idea is to
propagate the constraint T towards the leaves of the term t according to the decompo-
sition Theorem 4.10. The procedure relies on a number of procedures that we describe
in the following.
Find The procedure Find(t) returns the last element of the chain pointed by t.is
(possibly t itself). This procedure is computed in O(v).
function Find(t:term): term
if t.is = nil then t else Find(t.is)
Min(T,T’) The procedure Min returns the most restrictive set-membership constraint
between T and T’ where we take nil as the most liberal set-constraint. Since the rank
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procedure C(t:term, T:term list tag)
var t1, t2, s:term; T’:term list tag;
(1) s := Find(t);
(2) (let T’ = Min(s.cstr,T)) in
(3) if s.cstr/ = T’ then
(4) s.cstr := T’;
(5) case s
(6) s.isvar:skip
(7) s.fn = pair:t1 := s.arg.tr; t2 := s.arg.next.tr;
C(t1,T); C(t2,T)
(8) s.fn = E( ,C), K(C,T):t1 := s.arg.tr; C(t1,T)
(9) s.fn = E( ,C), not K(C,T)
(10):let G = Gmu(C,T) in
(11) if G = nil then Stop
(12) else t1 := Guess(G);
(13) if U(t1,s.arg.tr) then skip
(14) else Stop
(15) s.fn = C, K(C,T):skip
(16) s.fn = C, not K(C,T):Stop
Fig. 6. Membership set-constraints propagation procedure
of the set-membership constraint is explicitly presented in the tag 8eld, this procedure
is computed in O(1).
function Min(T,T’:term_list_tag):term_list_tag
case (T,T’)
(nil,_):T’
(_,nil):T
(_,_):if T.tag < T’.tag then T else T’
K(C,T), Gmu(C,T) The function K(C,T) checks whether the constant C is in K(T )
and the function Gmu(C,T) computes the list of terms t such E(t; C)∈G,(T ). Both
functions can be computed as follows. Let {C1; : : : ; Cp} be the set of constants occurring
in the program. We allocate an array A with the following initialization:
A = array [1..p] of {known:bool, point: term_list}
A[i].known := false;
A[i].point := nil
We then visit the terms pointed by T. If we cross a term E(t; Ci) such that A[i].known
= false, we insert t in the corresponding list. When we cross a constant C i we set
A[i].known := true and visit the terms in the corresponding list. This procedure can
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be computed in O(e). When we are done, the list corresponding to C i contains the
result for the function Gmu(C i,T).
Guess(G) The function Guess(G) non-deterministically selects a term in the list G.
This can be done in O(v). Note that thanks to sharing we can conclude that the size
of the minimum generator set is linear in the size of the program.
Stop. The function Stop halts the computation and returns false, having found that
the constraints are not satis8able. This can be done in O(1).
U(t1,t2) At control point (13) we call the uni8cation procedure U that tries to
unify the current term E(t,C) with an element E(s,C) in the minimum generator
set. This is the uni8cation procedure described in [7] with the exception of procedure
Union(t1,t2) which let the 8eld t1.is point to t2 (a full description is available in
[5]). In our case, this procedure must also propagate the set-membership constraint of
t1 to the term t2: if we identify the term t1 with the term t2 then t2 must satisfy
the set-membership constraint of t1 too.
Complexity. We argue that the main program (5) runs in NPTIME. A 6ow analysis
reveals that:
• A call to C(t,T) either terminates or decreases the rank of the constraint in the
8eld cstr and makes either one or two calls to C or one call to U. Since we have
n ranks and v nodes, the situation where the rank is decreased may arise at most
nv times.
• A call to U(t1,t2) either terminates or calls Union on Find(t1), Find(t2) and
possibly their arguments. Union in turn makes Find(t1) unreachable and may call
C. The number of calls to Union is then in O(e).
9. Decidability of iteration without pairing
In this section we show that we can still decide the reachability problem for a certain
class of iterated processes without pairing. This class allows to encode the ping-pong
protocols studied by Dolev et al. [18]. They give an O(n3) algorithm (n being the size
of the protocol) that checks ‘correctness’ by computing the intersection of a context-
free language and a regular language. Our approach is quite diLerent as it relies on
recognisable relations (or equivalently rational transductions). The algorithm we derive
still runs in PTIME and it allows to handle more general protocols (cf. Section 9.3).
Moreover, it opens the way to more general results such as: (i) the decidability of any
8rst-order formula constructed on the reachability predicate, and (ii) the possibility of
starting from an in8nite (regular) initial knowledge (this can be used for parametrised
veri8cation).
We consider 8rst the case of symmetric keys and abbreviate a term E(: : : (E(t; Cn);
: : :); C2); C1) with C1C2 : : : Cnt. We will also denote with <; =; : : : 8nite words over the
set of names N.
We consider processes that are the parallel composition of iterated threads, where a
thread is either a 8ltered input followed by an output or a 8ltered input followed by
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an invalid assertion (cf. hypotheses of Proposition 8.1):
P ::= P|P|it Q
Q ::= ?x = <y:!=y:0|?x = <y:asrt(false):0:
Let us consider a con8guration (P; T0) where P is a process of the type speci8ed above
and T0⊂finM is a set of messages not containing the pairing constructor. We denote
with K the set of names occurring in either P or T0 plus a fresh name F to signal an
invalid assertion.
We regard a process it ?x= <y:!=y:0 as a rewrite rule <y !→ =y and a process ?x= <y:
asrt(false):0 as a rewrite rule <y !→Fy. Let RP be the set of rewrite rules associated
to the program P. The reduction of a con8guration (P; T ) can then be described as
(P; T )→ (P; T ∪ {=t}) if <t ∈ S(A(T )) and <y !→ =y ∈ RP (6)
and the reachability problem reduces to checking whether (P; T0)
∗→ (P; T ′) and Ft ∈T ′.
9.1. Simpli)cation of derivations
We note that, in principle, the message <t oLered by the adversary in the reduction
(6) may contain in t the pairing constructor. We show next that if pairing does not
occur in the initial knowledge T0 then we can restrict our attention to reductions where
no pairing is used. The simple idea is to replace pairs synthesised by the adversary
by some term t0 in the initial knowledge. To eliminate pairs, we de8ne Ut for a term
t ∈ S(A(T )) as follows:
UC = C if C ∈N
Ct = C Ut
〈t1t2〉 = t0 where t0 is some 8xed term in T0:
From a derivation (P0; T0)
∗→ (Pn; Tn), we derive the sequence (P0; T0) ∗→ (Pn; Tn) by stat-
ing that if s is emitted (respectively received) in the original sequence then s is emit-
ted (respectively received) in the derived sequence. For general processes, the second
derivation is usually not a correct derivation. The next proposition states that this is
not the case for our restricted class and gives the result we are looking for (a proof is
available in [5]).
Proposition 9.1. Let (P0; T0)
∗→ (Pn; Tn) then (P0; T0) ∗→ (Pn; Tn) is a correct derivation,
moreover (P0; T0)
∗→ (Pn; Tn)→ err i? (P0; T0) ∗→ (Pn; Tn)→ err.
9.2. A polynomial time algorithm for deciding reachability
Given the previous result, we assume in the following that the operation of synthesis
does not introduce pairs. Then it is possible to understand the reduction of con8gura-
tions via the notion of pre)x word rewriting which is de8ned next. Let R be a 8nite
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set of rewrite rules of the form <y !→ =y where <; =∈K∗. The pre)x rewrite relation
induced by R is the least relation !→ on K∗ such that <? !→ =? whenever ?∈K+ and
<y !→ =y∈R. The re6exive transitive closure of the relation is denoted by ∗!→. The
requirement ? not empty is not standard but we can go back to usual word pre8x
rewriting by replacing each rule <y !→ =y by the |K | rules <Cy !→ =Cy for all C ∈K .
This new system generates the same relation and the transformation is linear in |K |.
This allows to use the classical result on regular languages and pre8x rewrite systems
that we state now.
Given a language L and a 8nite set R of rewrite rules de8ning a pre8x rewrite
relation !→, the set of successors of L is de8ned as
Post∗R(L) = {@ | ∃? ∈ L? ∗!→ @}:
The relation ∗!→ is a recognisable relation as shown by [12,13]. In particular, we will
rely on the following fact.
Fact 1. If L is a regular language, then Post∗R(L) is a regular language. Given an au-
tomaton A accepting L, we can compute in time O(|A| |R|2) an automaton accepting
Post∗R(L) (|R| is the size of R, |A| is the size of A).
Consider a set T ⊂fin K+. Then the operations of analysis and synthesis performed
by the adversary can be represented by the rules:
Cy !→ y if C ∈ K(T ) (analysis);
y !→ Cy if C ∈ K(T ) (synthesis):
Initially, we adjoin these rules to RP for all the constants C ∈K(T0). However during
the reduction the sets T and K(T ) may evolve forcing the introduction of new rules. We
may compute this information iteratively by de8ning a sequence (Kn; Rn) as follows:
K0 = K(T0); R0 = RP ∪ {C? !→ ?; ? !→ C? |C ∈ K0};
Kn+1 = Post∗Rn(T0) ∩ K Rn+1 = Rn ∪ {C? !→ ?; ? !→ C? |C ∈ Kn+1}:
Since Kn⊆Kn+1 and K is 8nite the iteration converges to a pair (Kp; Rp) such that
Kp =Kp+1; Rp =Rp+1 and we de8ne the closure of R to be Cl(R)=Rp. Computing
Cl(R) requires at most |K | steps. Each step involves computing an automaton recognis-
ing Post∗Rn(T0) which is done in O(|T0|(|K |+|RP|)2) and testing if C ∈Post∗Rn(T0) for all
C’s which is also done in O(|T0|(|K |+ |R|)2). By construction, we have that the image
of T0 by Cl(R) is stable under synthesis and analysis S(A(Post∗Cl(R)(T0)))=Post
∗
Cl(R)(T0).
The closure operator Cl depends on T0 and we assume in the remaining of this section
that this initial knowledge T0 is some 8xed set (hence we write Cl instead of ClT0 ).
Theorem 9.2. Under the hypotheses above, (P; T0)
∗→ err i? Ft ∈Post∗Cl(R)(T0) for
some t, and this can be decided in time polynomial in the size of the processes
and the initial knowledge.
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Proof. We remark that the hypothesis that the initial knowledge is a 8nite set of
messages is not required and that the result holds for any initial set which is a (possibly
in8nite) regular set.
(i) S(A(Tn))⊆Post∗Cl(R)(T0). The proof is by induction on the number n of reduc-
tion steps. The case n=0 is obvious. Let us assume that (P; T0)
∗→ (Pn; Tn)→ (Pn+1; Tn+1)
with S(A(Tn))⊆Post∗Cl(R)(T0). The only case to consider is Tn+1 =Tn ∪{t} where t= =?
such that <?∈ S(A(Tn)). By induction hypothesis <?∈ S(A(Tn))⊆Post∗Cl(R)(T0), there-
fore =?∈Post∗Cl(R)(T0) since <y !→ =y∈R. The closure of Post∗Cl(R)(T0) by synthesis
and analysis yields the result.
(ii) Post∗Cl(R)(T0)⊆ S(A(Tn)). We consider the sequence Post∗Rn(T0) occurring in the
computation of Cl(R) and we show that for all s∈Post∗Rn(T0), there is some sequence
(P0; T0)
∗→ (Pp; Tp) with s∈ S(A(Tp)). To rewrite sequence s0 !→ · · · !→ sm = s, s0 ∈T0,
we associate the pair (n; m) where m is the length of the sequence and n is such
that s∈Post∗Rn(T0) and s =∈Post∗Rl(T0) with l¡n. This measure de8nes a well-founded
ordering and the proof is by induction on this ordering.
Base case. This means that s∈T0 and the property holds.
Induction step. s0 !→ · · · !→ sm−1 !→ sm = s. The last rule is some <y !→ =y with sm−1
= <s′ and s= =s′ or Cy !→y with sm−1 =Cs′ and s= s′ or y !→Cy with s=Csm−1. In
these latter cases, we have that C is smaller than s in our ordering, therefore there is
some (P0; T0)
∗→ (Pp; Tp) with C ∈ S(A(Tp)). Moreover there is some (P0; T0) ∗→ (Pk; Tk)
such that sm−1 ∈ S(A(Tk)).
Since we consider iterated processes, we also have a reduction
(P0; T0)
∗→(Pp |Pk; Tp ∪ Tk) with C; sm ∈ S(A(Tp ∪ Tk)):
Therefore either s∈ S(A(Tp ∪Tk)) if s is obtained from sm−1 by a rule Cy !→y or
y !→Cy, or there is a reduction by a process ?s= <y:!=y:0 which yields Tp ∪Tk ∪{s}.
Remark 9.3. Actually a stronger result holds since we have shown that the relation
∗!→ is a rational relation: the 8rst-order logic based upon atoms s ∗!→ t with the usual
boolean connectives and quanti8cation on con8gurations (i.e. words) is decidable.
9.3. Extensions and ping-pong protocols
An interesting extension concerns public keys which can be handled as follows: to
a process
it ?x = <y:z ← dec(y; C):!=z:0:
we associate the rules <C′y !→ =y for all C′ such that C ∈ Inv(C′) and we proceed as
before. Slight variations on the process grammar—usually needed in the real encoding
of processes—can be handled in the same way.
As a second extension, we consider the use of an arbitrary number of alternations of
8ltered inputs and outputs (without shared variables between two input–output steps).
The idea of the construction remains the same, but it is a little bit more complex.
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The processes that we consider consist of an iteration of a parallel composition of
elementary processes. Each elementary process can be represented as a sequence of
rewrite rules <1y1 !→ =1y1; : : : ; <pyp !→ =pyp. It is not possible to take R as the set of
all these rewrite rules, since there is an ordering on these rules depending on the
structure of the process. For instance, consider the process:
it(?x1 = C1y1:!C2y1:?x2 = C0y2:!C1y2:0)
and T0 = {C0}. The set of rules is {C1y1 !→C2y1; C0y2 !→C1y2} which implies that,
e.g., C1C0; C2C0 can be known by the adversary. This does not respect the intended
behaviour of the process that actually cannot perform any action.
The decision algorithm consists of two rules R1;R2 which transform a pair (rewrite
rules, process expression) into a simpler pair using the closure operation de8ned in
Section 9.2. Given some—8xed—initial knowledge T0, Cl(R) denotes the closure of
the set of rewrite rules R related to T0.
(R1) (R; P) → (Cl(R); P)
if R = Cl(R);
(R2) (R; it(?x = <y:!=y:P) |P′) → (R ∪ {<y !→ =y}; it P|P′)
if Post∗R(T0) ∩ {<? | ? ∈ K+} = ∅:
Proposition 9.4. The rewrite system R1;R2 is terminating and conEuent.
Termination is straightforward, and the fact that Cl(R∪{<→ =})=Cl(Cl(R)∪
{<→ =}) yields local con6uence, hence con6uence. Assuming the same coding as
for simpler processes, we can state the following proposition.
Proposition 9.5. (P; T0)
∗→ err i? Ft ∈Post∗Cl(R)(T0) which can be decided in time poly-
nomial in the size of the processes and the initial knowledge.
This proposition can be used to check the correctness of ping-pong protocols which
describe the exchange of messages between two participants. At each step each partic-
ipant applies a sequence of decryptions and encryptions to the last message received
and sends it back to the other participant.
One of the simplest examples of such protocols can be described as follows: We
have a 8nite set of participants I; J; : : : .
If participant S wants to make sure a secret information SEC is received exclu-
sively by participant R, it sends to the latter the secret message SEC encrypted
with the public key of R. The receiver R decrypts the message, encrypts it with
the public key of S and sends it back to S.
In presence of a dishonest participant A, this protocol is insecure. For instance, A can
intercept the message from S, send it to R as if he was the original sender, let R
decrypt the message and send it back to A encrypted with the public key of A. Here
is a model that will detect this type of attack.
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• To each channel between a participant I and J , we associate a symmetric key CI; J
which belongs to the initial knowledge (hence any message can be intercepted). For
a participant I , we denote with CPubI its public key and with C
Priv
I its secret key.
• Assume SEC is some name used nowhere else. The (iterated) protocol describing
the communication between a sender S and a receiver R is the (possibly iterated)
parallel composition of the processes
?x = start:!CS;RCPubR SEC:?y:z ← dec(y; CPrivS ):[z = SEC]: : : :
for S and
?x:[x = CS;Rx′]:y ← dec(x′:CPrivR ):!CR;SCPubS y:0 |
?x = CA;R x′:y ← dec(y; x′CPrivR ):!CR;ACPubA y:0
for R. To specify that the name SEC must stay secret we add the following
observer which runs in parallel with the other processes.
?x = SEC:asrt(false):0:
• The initial knowledge includes the name start, the symmetric keys CI; J representing
the public channels, the public key CPubI of each participant, and the private key of
a dishonest participant CPrivA .
Iterated versions of this type of protocols can be handled in our approach by intro-
ducing suitable (pre8x) rewrite rules. The 6exibility of our model allows to encode
protocols which are not ping-pong protocols, for instance some participant may interact
with several participants in the same round.
Following the work described here, Comon et al. [16] and one of the authors [1]
have suggested interesting generalisations of our results that rely on tree-automata and
set-constraints, respectively. One can then handle protocols making a limited use of
pairing at the price of a higher complexity (DEXPTIME).
Appendix A.
A.1. Proof of Lemma 4.9
(1) First we observe that for any set of messages T and ground substitution :
(A) PK (T ) ∩N ⊆ PK (T ) ∩N:
Then we prove by induction on n that:
K(T )n ⊆ K(T ):
It follows that
K(Ti) =
⋃
n∈!
K(Ti)n ⊆ K(Ti):
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To show the other inclusion, we prove
(1′) C ∈ accK(Ti)(xj)⇐ C ∈ K(Ti) if j ¡ i:
by induction on the pair (i; j) lexicographically ordered.
(i=1) The condition j¡i is not realized.
(i¿1) Suppose C ∈ accK(Ti)(xj). Since  is admissible we know that xj ∈ S(A
(Tj)).
We show that K(Tj)=K(Tj). Since K(Tj)⊆K(Tj), by de8nition of K , it is enough
to prove:
PK(Tj)(Tj) ∩N = K(Tj):
Suppose C ∈PK(Tj)(Tj)∩N and C =∈K(Tj) (otherwise we are done). Then
∃k ¡ j xk ∈ PK(Tj)(Tk) and C ∈ accK(Tj)(xk)
and by inductive hypothesis on (j; k) it follows C ∈K(Tj)⊆K(Ti).
Therefore, by Proposition 4.3(3),
xj ∈ S(A(Tj)) = SK(Tj)(PK(Tj)(Tj)):
If C ∈K(Tj)⊆K(Ti) we are done. Otherwise:
∃k ¡ j xk ∈ PK(Ti)(Tj) and C ∈ accK(Ti)(xk):
Then, by inductive hypothesis on (i; k), C ∈K(Ti).
(2) By (1) and Proposition 4.3(3)
S(A(Ti)) = SK(Ti)(PK(Ti)(Ti)) and
S(A(Ti)) = SK(Ti)(PK(Ti)(Ti)) = SK(Ti)(PK(Ti)(Ti)):
We note that if t ∈ PK(Ti)(Ti) then ∃t′ ∈PK(Ti)(Ti)t= t′. We conclude that t′ ∈PK(Ti)
(Ti) and S(A(Ti))⊆ S(A(Ti)).
To show the other inclusion, we prove by induction on i that
PK(Ti)(Ti) ⊆ SK(Ti)(PK(Ti)(Ti)):
This holds obviously for i=1 since T1 contains no variables. So suppose i¿1 and
t ∈PK(Ti)(Ti). Two cases can arise:
∃t′ ∈PK(Ti)(Ti) t= t′. Then t= t′ ∈ PK(Ti)(Ti).
∃xj ∈PK(Ti)(Ti) t ∈PK(Ti)(xj). Since  is admissible:
(xj) ∈ S(A(Tj)) = SK(Tj)(PK(Tj)(Tj))
= SK(Tj)((PK(Tj)(Tj))) by inductive hypothesis
⊆ SK(Ti)((PK(Ti)(Ti))) since Tj ⊆ Ti:
(3) To prove S(Gi)= S(Gi) we recall Proposition 4.5(2) and proceed by induction
on the structure of the term. To establish the equation S(Gi)= S((Gi\V )), it suRces
to prove (Gi ∩V )⊆ S((Gi\V )).
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To this end, we de8ne Vj = {x1; : : : ; xj−1} and for X ⊆MV we set vj(X )= {t ∈X |Var
(t)⊆Vj}. For j6i we have Gj ⊆ S(A(Tj))⊆ S(A(Ti))= S(Gi), and thus Gj =
vj(Gj)⊆ vj(S(Gi)). We prove by induction on j, j6i, that:
Vj ⊆ S((Gi\V )):
• The base case (j=1) is obvious since V1 = ∅.
• For the inductive step, assume the property holds for Vj. We show xj ⊆ S((Gi
\V )):
xj ∈ S(Gj)
⊆ S((vj(S(Gi))))
⊆ S((vj(Gi))) since S commutes with  and vj
⊆ S(((Gi\V ) ∪ Vj))
= S((Gi\V ) ∪ Vj):
By inductive hypothesis Vj ⊆ S((Gi\V )), thus S((Gi\V )∪ Vj)= S((Gi\V )).
Therefore we have established the property for Vj+1. We end the proof by noticing
(Gi ∩V )⊆ (Vi).
A.2. Proof of Lemma 6.4
Let n be the size of E. All the variables we consider will have a rank bound by n.
We proceed by induction on the order  de8ned with respect to the maximal rank n.
(e1)([f(˜s)=f(˜t)]Eq; E; 4)
e1→ ([s1 = t1] · · · [sm = tm]Eq; E; 4).
By de8nition, we have ,([s= t])¿,([si = ti]) for i=1; : : : ; m. Then either the reduc-
tion terminates or there exists a substitution 1 satisfying (i)(ii) such that ([s1 = t1] · · ·
[sm = tm]Eq; E; 4)→ 1([s2 = t2] · · · [sm = tm]Eq; E; 4).
Since 1 is decreasing ,([s= t])¿,(1[si = ti]) for i=2; : : : ; m. Therefore there is
some decreasing substitution 2 such that 1([s2 = t2] · · · [sm = tm]Eq; E; 4) ∗→ (2 ◦ 1)
([s3 = t3] : : : [sm = tm]Eq; E; 4). Iterating the process, we obtain a substitution = n
◦ · · · ◦ 1 and Lemma 6.3(1) proves that  is decreasing.
(e2−4) ([xi = t]Eq; E; 4)
e2−4→ (Eq; E; 4) where  is a decreasing substitution by con-
struction. Moreover if t =∈Var then xi ∈Dom().
(e5)([xi = 〈t1; t2〉]Eq; E; 4) e5→ ([x′= t1][x′′= t2]4′Eq; 4′E; 4′ ◦ 4), where 4′= [〈x′; x′′〉=xi].
By de8nition, we have
(a) ,([xi = 〈t1; t2〉])¿,([x′= t1]).
(b) ,([xi = 〈t1; t2〉])¿,([x′′= t2]).
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By (a), the induction hypothesis applies. Then either the reduction terminates or
there exists a substitution 1 satisfying: (i) 1 is decreasing, (ii) x′ ∈Dom(1). By
induction hypothesis, we have the following reduction:
([xi = 〈t1; t2〉]Eq; E; 4) ∗→([1x′′ = 1t2]1[〈x′; x′′〉=xi]Eq; 1[〈x′; x′′〉=xi]E; 1 ◦ 4):
Since 1 is decreasing, by Lemma 6.3(2) either ,([x′′= t2])¿,([1x′′= 1t2]) or 1
([x′′= t2])≡ [x′′= t2]. By (b), the induction hypothesis applies. Then either the re-
duction terminates or there exists some substitution 2 satisfying (i) and (ii). We
distinguish two cases depending on whether 1x′′= x′′ or not.
• 1x′′= x′′.
The induction hypothesis yields: 2 is decreasing and x′′ ∈Dom(2).
(i) Let = 2 ◦ 1 ◦ [〈x′; x′′〉=xi]. If x′ ∈Dom(1); x′′ ∈Dom(2), rk(x′)= rk(x′′)=
rk(xi), and i decreasing for i=1; 2, then (2 ◦ 1)(x′) ≡ x′ and (2 ◦ 1)(x′′) ≡ x′′.
Then x′ ∈Dom(21); x′′∈Dom(2 ◦1) and, by Lemma 6.3(3)  is decreasing.
(ii) By de8nition, xi ∈Dom().
• 1x′′ ≡ x′′.
Let = 21[〈x′; x′′〉=xi].
(i) We have x′; x′′ ∈Dom(1), and 1 decreasing implies that rk(x′)¿rk(1x′) and
rk(x′′)¿rk(1x′′). Therefore rk(x′)¿rk(21x′) and rk(x′′)¿rk(21x′′) which proves
that x′ ≡ 21x′ and x′′ ≡ 21x′′. Then x′; x′′ ∈Dom(21) and Lemma A.3(3) proves
that  is decreasing.
(ii) By de8nition xi ∈Dom().
In each case, we get a substitution  satisfying the requirements of the lemma.
(e6)([xi =E(t; C)]Eq; E; 4)
e→
6
([x = t]4′Eq; 4′E; 4′ ◦ 4);
with x fresh; 4′ = [E(x; C)=xi]; rk(x) = rk(xi):
By de8nition, ,([xi =E(t; C)])¿,([x= t]) since |E(t; C)|¿|t|. The induction hypoth-
esis applies: either the reduction terminates or there exists a substitution 1 satisfying
(i) and (ii). Let = 1 ◦ [E(x; C)=xi].
(i) We observe that x∈Dom(1), 1 is decreasing, and rk(x)= rk(xi). Then  is
decreasing by Lemma 6.3(3).
(ii) By de8nition, xi ∈Dom().
Therefore ([xi =E(t; C)]Eq; E; 4)
∗→ (Eq; E; 4) and  satis8es the requirements of the
lemma.
(e7) ([xi = E(t; C)]Eq; E; 4)
e→
7
([t′ = t][E(t′; C)=xi](Eq; E; 4)
with rk(xi) ¿ rk(t′):
By de8nition ,([xi =E(t; C)])¿,([t′= t]) since rk(xi)¿rk(t′). The induction hy-
pothesis applies and either the reduction terminates or there is some 1 satisfying (i),
(ii).
(i) Let = 1 ◦ [E(t′; C)=xi]. By Lemma 6.3(1),  is decreasing. (ii) We observe
that xi ∈Dom().
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Therefore ([xi =E(t; C)]Eq; E; 4)
∗→ (Eq; E; 4) and  satis8es the requirement of the
lemma.
A.3. Proof of Proposition 6.12
We recall that we denote with k; k ′; : : : con8gurations and with c; c′; : : : symbolic
con8gurations. In this section the notation [t=x] denotes the substitution ′ such that
′(y)= (y) if y = x and ′(x)= t. For the sake of simplicity, we will not show
the processes in parallel composition of the leftmost thread when writing a symbolic
con8guration. In all the cases (1–7) we prove the following two properties:
(A) If c R
s
→ c′ k ′ ∈ Im(c′) then ∃k ∈ Im(c)(k R→ k ′).
(B) If k ∈ Im(c) and k R→ k ′ then ∃c′(c R
s
→ c′ and k ′ ∈ Im(c′)).
Property (A) implies Im(SuccR
s
s (c))⊆SuccR(Im(c))) whereas property (B) implies
SuccR(Im(c))⊆ Im(SuccRss (c)). Moreover, to handle easily instantiations of variables
in key position, we de8ne a subset of all symbolic con8guration S0 as
follows.
Denition A.1. We denote by S the set of all symbolic con8gurations and by S0 the
subset of S such that c∈S0 iL the process part of c is of the shape (we omit the
case for ← prjr( )):
?x:P
| !t:P and t ∈MV
| x ← prjl(〈t; t′〉):P and 〈t; t′〉 ∈MV
| x ← dec(t; C):P and t ∈MV
| [s = t]P1; P2 and s; t ∈MV :
Then we will make use of the following lemma.
Lemma A.2. (1) If (A) holds for any c∈S0 then (A) holds for any c∈S.
(2) If (B) holds for any c∈S0 then (B) holds for any c∈S.
Proof. In the following, 2 denotes the substitution of variables in key positions that
is used in symbolic rules !s, pls1, d
s
1, d
s
2, d
s
3, m
s
1, and m
s
2. We outline the proof in the
cases ({!s} and {!}) (the other cases are similar).
(1) If c∈S and c !
s
→ c′ and k ′ ∈ Im(c′) with the substitution of variables in key
position 2, then we must have c≡ (!t:P; T; E; I) and 2 ↓ (t; E). We notice that 2c !
s
→ c′:
as 2c∈S0, we can conclude that ∃k ∈ Im(2c)(k !→ k ′). But then, k ∈ Im(2c)⊆ Im(c);
hence (A) holds for c.
(2) If k !→ k ′ and k ∈ Im(c), then it must be that c≡ (!t:P; T; E; I). We notice that
there exists 2 ↓ (t; E) such that k ∈ Im(2c) and thus, as 2c∈S0, we can conclude that
∃c′(2c !
s
→ c′ and k ′ ∈ Im(c′)) But then, we just have to remark that c !
s
→ c′; hence (B)
holds for c.
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By Lemma A.2, when proving (A) and (B) we just have to consider the case where
c∈S0. This will make the following proof much simpler. In the following we consider
the three most interesting cases: input, decryption, and positive conditional.
Input
(1-A) If c ?
s
→ c′ and k ′ ∈ Im(c′) then it must be that:

c ≡ (?x:P; T; E; I)
c′ ≡ (P; T; (E; x : T ); I)
k ′ ≡ (′P; ′T ); ′ |= (E; x : T ); I
We de8ne t= ′(x) and = ′[x=x] (we note that [t=x] ◦ = ′). With these de8nitions,
it follows from ′ |= (E; x : T ); I (and the hypothesis x =∈Var(T; E; I)) that:{
 |= E; I
t ∈ S(A(T )) So if we de8ne k ≡ (?x:P; T ); we have :{
k ∈ Im(c)
k ?→([t=x]P; T ) = (′P; ′T ) = k ′
(1-B) If k ∈ Im(c) and k ?→ k ′ then it must be that:

c ≡ (?x:P; T; E; I)
k ≡ (?x:P; T );  |= E; I
k ′ ≡ ([t=x]P; T ); t ∈ S(A(T ))
We de8ne ′= [t=x] ◦  and c′=(P; T; (E; x : T ); I). As c ?
s
→ c′, it remains to show that
k ′ ∈ Im(c′), which follows from k ′=(′P; T )= (′P; ′T ) (′T = T as x =∈Var(T ))
and ′ |= (E; x : T ); I .
Decryption
(3-A) This case will make use of the following lemma, whose proof is left to the
reader.
Lemma A.3. Suppose x =∈Var(E; I), xi :Ti ∈E and either (i) 4= [E(x; C)=xi] and C ∈K
(Ti) or (ii) 4= [E(t; C)=xi], E(t; C)∈G,(Ti). Then:
( |= 4E; 4I ⇒  ◦ 4 |= E; I):
• If c d
s
1→ c′ and k ′ ∈ Im(c′) then it must be that:

c ≡ (x ← dec(E(t; C); C′):P; T; E; I) and C′ ∈ Inv(C);
c′ ≡ ([t=x]P; T; E; I);
k ′ ≡ ([t=x]P; T );  |= E; I:
So if we de8ne k ≡ (x← dec(E(t; C); C′):P; T ), we have:{
k ∈ Im(c);
k d→([t=x]P; T ) = k ′ as [t=x] ◦  =  ◦ [t=x]:
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• If c d
s
2→ c′ and k ′ ∈ Im(c′) then it must be that:

c ≡ (x ← dec(xi; C′):P; T; E; I); C ∈ K(Ti); C′ ∈ Inv(C);
c′ ≡ [E(x; C)=xi](P; T; E; I);
k ′ ≡ (′ ◦ [E(x; C)=xi])(P; T ); ′ |= [E(x; C)=xi]E; [E(x; C)=xi]I:
We de8ne  as follows:

(xj) = ′(xj) if xj =∈ {x; xi};
(xi) = E(′x; C);
(x) = x:
We note that [′x=x] ◦ = ′ ◦ [E(x; C)=xi]. With these de8nitions, it follows from ′ |=
[E(x; C)=xi]E; [E(x; C)=xi]I and C ∈K(Ti) that  |= E; I (justi8ed by Lemma A.3(1)).
So if we de8ne k ≡ (x← dec(xi; C′):P; T )≡ (x← dec(E(′x; C); C′):P; T ), we
have: 

k ∈ Im(c)
k d→([′x=x]P; T ) = ([′x=x] ◦ )(P; T ) by x =∈ Var(T )
= k ′ by[′x=x] ◦  = ′ ◦ [E(x; C)=xi]:
• If c d
s
3→ c′ and k ′ ∈ Im(c′) then it must be that:

c ≡ (x ← dec(xi; C′):P; T; E; I); C′ ∈ Inv(C);
c′ ≡ [E(t; C)=xi]([t=x]P; T; E; I); E(t; C) ∈ G,(Ti);
k ′ ≡ (′ ◦ [E(x; C)=xi])([t=x]P; T ); ′ |= [E(t; C)=xi]E; [E(t; C)=xi]I:
We de8ne  as follows:

(xj) = ′(xj) if xj =∈ {x; xi};
(xi) = E(′t; C);
(x) = x:
We note that [′t=x] ◦ = ′ ◦ [E(t; C)=xi]. With these de8nitions, it follows from ′ |=
[E(t; C)=xi]E; [E(t; C)=xi]I and E(t; C)∈G,(Ti) that  |= E; I (justi8ed by Lemma
A.3(2)).
So if we de8ne k ≡ (x← dec(xi; C′):P; T )≡ (x← dec(E(′t; C); C′):P; T ), we
have: 

k ∈ Im(c);
k d→([′t=x]P; T ) = ([′t=x] ◦ )(P; T ) by x =∈ Var(T )
= k ′ by [′t=x] ◦  = ′ ◦ [E(t; C)=xi]:
(3-B) If k ∈ Im(c) and k d→ k ′ then there are only two cases (recall that we only
consider con8gurations c in S0):
(i)


c ≡ (x ← dec(E(t; C′); C):P; T; E; I); C′ ∈ Inv(C);
k ≡ (x ← dec(E(t; C′); C):P; T );  |= E; I;
k ′ ≡ ([t=x]P; T ):
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(ii)


c ≡ (x ← dec(xi; C′):P; T; E; I); C′ ∈ Inv(C);
k ≡ (x ← dec(xi; C′):P; T );  |= E; I;
k ′ ≡ ([t′=x]P; T ); xi = E(t′; C):
In the 8rst case, it is easy to show that c
ds1→ c′ with c′≡ ([t=x]P; T; E; I) and we have
k ′ ∈ Im(c′). In the second case, as E(t′; C)= xi ∈ S(A(Ti)), the decomposition The-
orem 4.10 states that there are only two possibilities.
• If t′ ∈ S(A(Ti)) and C ∈K(Ti) then rule ds2 will apply and c
ds2→ c′ where c′≡ [E
(x; C)=xi](P; T; E; I). We de8ne ′= [xi=xi; t′=x] and note that ′ ◦ [E(x; C)=xi] =
[t′=x] ◦ . Then it is easy to show:
′ |= [E(x; C)=xi]E; [E(x; C)=xi]I; and
′([E(x; C)=xi](P; T )) = [t′=x] ◦ (P; T );
= ([t′=x]P; T ) by x =∈Var(T )
= k ′
i.e. k ′ ∈ Im(c′).
• Else we must have E(t′; C)= (E(t; C)) and E(t; C)∈G,(Ti), which implies c d
s
3→ c′
where c′≡ [E(t; C)=xi]([t=x]P; T; E; I). We de8ne ′= [xi=xi] and note that ′ ◦ [E
(t; C)=xi] = . Then it is easy to show:
′ |= [E(t; C)=xi]E; [E(t; C)=xi]I; and
′([E(t; C)=xi]([t=x]P; T )) = ([t=x]P; T )
= ([t=x]P; T )
= k ′
i.e. k ′ ∈ Im(c′).
Positive conditional
(5-A) If c
ms1→ c′ and k ′ ∈ Im(c′) then it must be that:

c ≡ ([s = t]P1; P2; T; E; I);
c′ ≡ 4(P1; T; E; I); ([s = t]; E; id) ∗→(∅; E′; 4);
k ′ ≡ ( ◦ 4)(P1; T );  |= E′; 4I:
We de8ne k ≡ ( ◦ 4)([s= t]P1; P2; T ). By Corollary 6.7(1) we know that ( ◦ 4) |=
s= t; E, and since  |= 4I we have, ( ◦ 4) |= I . Therefore:
{
k ∈ Im(c);
k m1→ k ′:
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(5-B) If k ∈ Im(c) and k m2→ k ′ then it must be that:

c ≡ ([s = t]P1; P2; T; E; I);
k ≡ ([s = t]P1; P2; T );  |= E; I and s = t;
k ′ ≡ (P1; T ):
By Corollary 6.7(2) we know that ([s= t]; E; id) ∗→ (∅; E′; 4′) and there is a ′ such
that ′ |= E′ and = ′ ◦ 4′. We de8ne c′≡ 4′(P1; T; E; I), and we have c m
s
1→ c′ and
k ′= ′(4′P1; 4′T ) ∈ Im(c′) (the property ′ |= 4′I follows directly from ′ ◦ 4′ |= I).
A.4. Proof of Proposition 7.2
The proof relies on the following lemma.
Lemma A.4. Let E≡ x1 :T1; : : : ; xn :Tn be an environment, T ⊇ Tn, G be a generator
for T, V = {x1; : : : ; xn−1}, and t ∈MV such that Var(t)⊆V . Then:
t =∈ S(G ∪ V )⇒ ∃I I ↓ and ∀ |= E; I t =∈ S(G):
Proof. By structural induction on t:
• If t≡C and C =∈ S(G ∪V ) then C =∈K(T ) which implies C =∈K(T )= S(G)∩N.
• If t≡ x, then we have t ∈ S(G ∪V ) and thus the implication holds trivially.
• If t≡〈t1; t2〉, t =∈ S(G ∪V ) then ∃i∈{1; 2} | ti =∈ S(G ∪V ). We apply the induction
hypothesis to ti to deduce that ∀ |= E; I ti =∈ S(G) and notice that ti =∈ S(G)
implies t= 〈t1; t2〉 =∈ S(G) (remember that S(G)= S(A(T ))).
• If t≡E(t′; C), we consider the (possibly empty) set:
X = {ti |E(ti; C) ∈ G}:
We suppose t =∈ S(G ∪V ). In particular ∀ti ∈Xti = t′, so we can de8ne a set of in-
equalities IX = {ti = t′ | ti ∈X }. Note that IX ↓. There are two cases:
(1) t′ ∈ S(G ∪V ). Then we must have C =∈ S(G ∪V ) and thus C =∈G. In that case, if
 |= E; IX then t=E(t′; C)∈ S(G) would imply (by Theorem 4.10) t′= ti with
ti ∈X , which is impossible because  |= IX .
(2) t′ =∈ S(G ∪V ). The induction hypothesis gives us a 8nite and consistent set of in-
equalities I . We denote I ′= I ∪ IX . Now if we take  |= E; I ′, the condition t ∈ S(G)
would imply (by Theorem 4.10) that either C ∈K(Ti) and t′ ∈ S(G), or t′= ti with
ti ∈X . The former cannot hold because  |= I and the latter because  |= IX .
From this we can deduce the following lemma.
Lemma A.5. Let (P; T; E; I) be a symbolic con)guration, G be a generator for T,
V =Var(E), and {t1; : : : ; tn}⊆MV . Then:
(∀ |= E; I t1 ∈ S(A(T )) ∨ · · · ∨ tn ∈ S(A(T ))) i? ∃iti ∈ S(G ∪ V ):
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Proof. (⇐) Immediate: (⇒) We show:
(∀i ∈ {1; : : : ; n}ti =∈ S(G ∪ V ))⇒ ∃ |= E; I ∀i ∈ {1; : : : ; n}ti =∈ S(G):
For each ti it follows from Lemma A.4 that:
ti =∈ S(G ∪ V )⇒ ∃Ii ↓ ∀ |= E; Ii ti =∈ S(G):
If we de8ne I ′= I ∪ (⋃i=1;:::;n Ii), Proposition 6.1 gives us a  such that  |= E; I and
∀i ti =∈ S(G).
Now Proposition 7.2 follows directly from Lemma A.5, using the fact that rule (scs)
will always test the condition I ↓.
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